[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20150520164613.GD10473@localhost>
Date: Wed, 20 May 2015 19:46:13 +0300
From: Petko Manolov <petkan@...-labs.com>
To: One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@...onical.com>,
"Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@...e.com>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, james.l.morris@...cle.com,
serge@...lyn.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-wireless@...r.kernel.org,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Kyle McMartin <kyle@...nel.org>,
David Woodhouse <david.woodhouse@...el.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Joey Lee <jlee@...e.de>, Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>,
zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, mricon@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [RFD] linux-firmware key arrangement for firmware signing
On 15-05-20 17:24:46, One Thousand Gnomes wrote:
>
> More to the point why do you want to sign firmware files ? Leaving aside the
> fact that someone will produce a device with GPLv3 firmware just to p*ss you
> off there's the rather more relevant fact that firmware for devices on a so
> called "trusted" platform already have signed firmware.
For "trusted" systems one would like to make sure everything that goes in has
known provenance. Maybe this was the idea?
> For external devices I don't normally have access to read system memory
> anyway, and signing firmware would achieve nothing unless you start doing
> crazy DRM style key exchanges to prove the endpoint is trusted. Any NSA trojan
> wifi stick is simply going to nod as the correct firmware is uploaded, and
> then ignore it. And if I'm just out to be a pain I can already just plug in a
> fake device claiming to be a usb disk with 256 bytes per sector (boom... exit
> machine stage right), or for that matter wire a USB stick with 5v connected to
> the mains at the nearest wall socket.
Yep, gaining physical access to the system is a game over. It is arguable how
"trusted" a networked machine could be and i guess the answer is "not much"...
Petko
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists