linux-kernel - Re: [RFD] linux-firmware key arrangement for firmware signing

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <20150521165101.GI18164@localhost>
Date:	Thu, 21 May 2015 19:51:02 +0300
From:	Petko Manolov <petkan@...-labs.com>
To:	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc:	David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>, Joey Lee <jlee@...e.de>,
	Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>,
	Kyle McMartin <kyle@...nel.org>,
	Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@...il.com>,
	LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
	Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>,
	Konstantin Ryabitsev <mricon@...nel.org>,
	Michal Marek <mmarek@...e.cz>,
	Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@...onical.com>,
	"Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@...e.com>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
	David Woodhouse <david.woodhouse@...el.com>,
	Linux Wireless List <linux-wireless@...r.kernel.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
	keyrings@...ux-nfs.org, Abelardo Ricart III <aricart@...nix.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
Subject: Re: [RFD] linux-firmware key arrangement for firmware signing

On 15-05-21 09:39:50, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> 
> It's also a performance cost because the average user of this signature stuff 
> doesn't actually want IMA, and IMA is checking the wrong think anyway.  
> IMA/EVM tells us "this file validly belongs in /lib/modules/whatever according 
> to whomever we trust for the filesystem".  We want to check "is this data, 
> regardless of where it was read from, a trusted module".

IMA-appraise does not care where the file comes from (although it may be 
persuaded to) and verifies file's data and meta-data against a signature.  I 
guess you should actually read the code. :)


		Petko
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/