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Message-ID: <CALQRfL4x-6fHH7S1M_2mT2E2yZSUg-hxF7TDycwDu7ngVtL9Uw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 24 May 2015 13:39:50 -0700
From: "Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@...nel.org>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...uxfoundation.org>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>,
"Ted Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>, Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@...il.com>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Aaron Jones <aaronmdjones@...il.com>,
Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Markku Savela <msa@...h.iki.fi>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] capabilities: Add a securebit to disable PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE
Thanks
Acked-By: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@...nel.org>
On Sat, May 23, 2015 at 12:45 PM, Serge E. Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com> wrote:
> On Thu, May 14, 2015 at 11:39:49PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> Per Andrew Morgan's request, add a securebit to allow admins to
>> disable PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE. This securebit will prevent processes
>> from adding capabilities to their ambient set.
>>
>> For simplicity, this disables PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE entirely rather
>> than just disabling setting previously cleared bits.
>>
>> Requested-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@...nel.org>
>> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
>> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>
>> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>
>> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
>> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>
>> Cc: Aaron Jones <aaronmdjones@...il.com>
>> CC: Ted Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
>> Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
>> Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
>> Cc: linux-api@...r.kernel.org
>> Cc: akpm@...uxfoundation.org
>> Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@...nel.org>
>> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
>> Cc: Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@...il.com>
>> Cc: Markku Savela <msa@...h.iki.fi>
>> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
>> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
>
> Interesting - at first I thought this wouldn't please Andrew as he'd
> want the inverse, but I guess this way keeps the pure-capabilities
> mode (with SECURE_ALL_BITS set) ambient-free which I suppose is
> really the important thing.
>
> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>
>
>> ---
>> include/uapi/linux/securebits.h | 11 ++++++++++-
>> security/commoncap.c | 3 ++-
>> 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h b/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h
>> index 985aac9e6bf8..35ac35cef217 100644
>> --- a/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h
>> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h
>> @@ -43,9 +43,18 @@
>> #define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS (issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
>> #define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED (issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED))
>>
>> +/* When set, a process cannot add new capabilities to its ambient set. */
>> +#define SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE 6
>> +#define SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED 7 /* make bit-6 immutable */
>> +
>> +#define SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE))
>> +#define SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED \
>> + (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED))
>> +
>> #define SECURE_ALL_BITS (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT) | \
>> issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) | \
>> - issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
>> + issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS) | \
>> + issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE))
>> #define SECURE_ALL_LOCKS (SECURE_ALL_BITS << 1)
>>
>> #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H */
>> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
>> index 09541a6a85a0..98aa1b129c12 100644
>> --- a/security/commoncap.c
>> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
>> @@ -983,7 +983,8 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
>> if (arg2 == PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE &&
>> (!cap_raised(current_cred()->cap_permitted, arg3) ||
>> !cap_raised(current_cred()->cap_inheritable,
>> - arg3)))
>> + arg3) ||
>> + issecure(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE)))
>> return -EPERM;
>>
>> new = prepare_creds();
>> --
>> 2.1.0
>>
>> --
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