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Message-ID: <1432669955.2450.269.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 26 May 2015 15:52:35 -0400
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Petko Manolov <petkan@...-labs.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@...onical.com>,
"Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@...e.com>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, james.l.morris@...cle.com,
serge@...lyn.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-wireless@...r.kernel.org,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Kyle McMartin <kyle@...nel.org>,
David Woodhouse <david.woodhouse@...el.com>,
Joey Lee <jlee@...e.de>, Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>,
mricon@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [RFD] linux-firmware key arrangement for firmware signing
On Tue, 2015-05-26 at 18:08 +0100, One Thousand Gnomes wrote:
> IMHO we want the supplier of a given firmware providing signatures on
> the firmware git tree if this is done. A generic linux-firmware owned key
> would be both a horrendously inviting attack target, and a single point of
> failure.
>
> Git can already do all the needed commit signing bits unless I'm missing
> something here ?
Nice! I haven't tried signing commits yet. Assuming the signatures can
be extracted from git, the firmware blob git commit signature could be
stored either as a security xattr or appended (eg. similar to kernel
modules). The end system owner could then make the decision to load the
associated public key or not.
Mimi
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