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Message-ID: <CALCETrWT9OOSz5yUDSFA9ObXRHvWOqSMG9xZ3MyBVJxOHkbxtg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2015 10:47:31 -0700
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Calvin Owens <calvinowens@...com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Miklos Szeredi <miklos@...redi.hu>,
Zefan Li <lizefan@...wei.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, kernel-team@...com,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...nvz.org>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6] procfs: Always expose /proc/<pid>/map_files/ and make
it readable
On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 10:27 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 8, 2015 at 8:39 PM, Calvin Owens <calvinowens@...com> wrote:
>> Currently, /proc/<pid>/map_files/ is restricted to CAP_SYS_ADMIN, and
>> is only exposed if CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is set.
>>
>> This interface very useful because it allows userspace to stat()
>> deleted files that are still mapped by some process, which enables a
>> much quicker and more accurate answer to the question "How much disk
>> space is being consumed by files that are deleted but still mapped?"
>> than is currently possible.
>>
>> This patch moves map_files/ out from behind CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE,
>> and adjusts the permissions enforced on it as follows:
>>
>> * proc_map_files_lookup()
>> * proc_map_files_readdir()
>> * map_files_d_revalidate()
>>
>> Remove the CAP_SYS_ADMIN restriction, leaving only the current
>> restriction requiring PTRACE_MODE_READ.
>>
>> In earlier versions of this patch, I changed the ptrace checks
>> in the functions above to enforce MODE_ATTACH instead of
>> MODE_READ. That was an oversight: all the information exposed
>> by the above three functions is already available with
>> MODE_READ from /proc/PID/maps. I was only being asked to
>> strengthen the protection around functionality provided by
>> follow_link(), not the above.
>>
>> So, I've left the checks for MODE_READ as-is, since AFAICS all
>> objections raised so far are addressed by the new CAP_SYS_ADMIN
>> check in follow_link(), explained below.
>>
>> * proc_map_files_follow_link()
>>
>> This stub has been added, and requires that the user have
>> CAP_SYS_ADMIN in order to follow the links in map_files/,
>> since there was concern on LKML both about the potential for
>> bypassing permissions on ancestor directories in the path to
>> files pointed to, and about what happens with more exotic
>> memory mappings created by some drivers (ie dma-buf).
>>
>> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
>> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
>> Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...nvz.org>
>> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>
>> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
>> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@...temov.name>
>> Signed-off-by: Calvin Owens <calvinowens@...com>
>> ---
>> Changes in v6: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN for follow_link(). Leave other
>> PTRACE_MODE_READ checks as-is, since CAP_SYS_ADMIN
>> alone addresses all concerns raised AFAICS.
>>
>> Changes in v5: s/dentry->d_inode/d_inode(dentry)/g
>>
>> Changes in v4: Return -ESRCH from follow_link() when get_proc_task()
>> returns NULL.
>>
>> Changes in v3: Changed permission checks to use PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH
>> instead of PTRACE_MODE_READ, and added a stub to
>> enforce MODE_ATTACH on follow_link() as well.
>>
>> Changes in v2: Removed the follow_link() stub that returned -EPERM if
>> the caller didn't have CAP_SYS_ADMIN, since the caller
>> in my chroot() scenario gets -EACCES anyway.
>>
>> fs/proc/base.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
>> 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
>> index 093ca14..0270191 100644
>> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
>> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
>> @@ -1641,8 +1641,6 @@ end_instantiate:
>> return dir_emit(ctx, name, len, 1, DT_UNKNOWN);
>> }
>>
>> -#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
>> -
>> /*
>> * dname_to_vma_addr - maps a dentry name into two unsigned longs
>> * which represent vma start and end addresses.
>> @@ -1669,11 +1667,6 @@ static int map_files_d_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
>> if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
>> return -ECHILD;
>>
>> - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
>> - status = -EPERM;
>> - goto out_notask;
>> - }
>> -
>> inode = d_inode(dentry);
>> task = get_proc_task(inode);
>> if (!task)
>> @@ -1762,6 +1755,28 @@ struct map_files_info {
>> unsigned char name[4*sizeof(long)+2]; /* max: %lx-%lx\0 */
>> };
>>
>> +/*
>> + * Only allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN to follow the links, due to concerns about how the
>> + * symlinks may be used to bypass permissions on ancestor directories in the
>> + * path to the file in question.
>> + */
>
> Cool, I think this looks good. Thanks!
>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
>
Looks good to me, too.
--Andy
> -Kees
>
>> +static void *proc_map_files_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
>> +{
>> + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
>> + return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
>> +
>> + return proc_pid_follow_link(dentry, nd);
>> +}
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Identical to proc_pid_link_inode_operations except for follow_link()
>> + */
>> +static const struct inode_operations proc_map_files_link_inode_operations = {
>> + .readlink = proc_pid_readlink,
>> + .follow_link = proc_map_files_follow_link,
>> + .setattr = proc_setattr,
>> +};
>> +
>> static int
>> proc_map_files_instantiate(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
>> struct task_struct *task, const void *ptr)
>> @@ -1777,7 +1792,7 @@ proc_map_files_instantiate(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
>> ei = PROC_I(inode);
>> ei->op.proc_get_link = proc_map_files_get_link;
>>
>> - inode->i_op = &proc_pid_link_inode_operations;
>> + inode->i_op = &proc_map_files_link_inode_operations;
>> inode->i_size = 64;
>> inode->i_mode = S_IFLNK;
>>
>> @@ -1801,10 +1816,6 @@ static struct dentry *proc_map_files_lookup(struct inode *dir,
>> int result;
>> struct mm_struct *mm;
>>
>> - result = -EPERM;
>> - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
>> - goto out;
>> -
>> result = -ENOENT;
>> task = get_proc_task(dir);
>> if (!task)
>> @@ -1858,10 +1869,6 @@ proc_map_files_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
>> struct map_files_info *p;
>> int ret;
>>
>> - ret = -EPERM;
>> - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
>> - goto out;
>> -
>> ret = -ENOENT;
>> task = get_proc_task(file_inode(file));
>> if (!task)
>> @@ -2050,7 +2057,6 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_timers_operations = {
>> .llseek = seq_lseek,
>> .release = seq_release_private,
>> };
>> -#endif /* CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE */
>>
>> static int proc_pident_instantiate(struct inode *dir,
>> struct dentry *dentry, struct task_struct *task, const void *ptr)
>> @@ -2549,9 +2555,7 @@ static const struct inode_operations proc_task_inode_operations;
>> static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[] = {
>> DIR("task", S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO, proc_task_inode_operations, proc_task_operations),
>> DIR("fd", S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR, proc_fd_inode_operations, proc_fd_operations),
>> -#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
>> DIR("map_files", S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR, proc_map_files_inode_operations, proc_map_files_operations),
>> -#endif
>> DIR("fdinfo", S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR, proc_fdinfo_inode_operations, proc_fdinfo_operations),
>> DIR("ns", S_IRUSR|S_IXUGO, proc_ns_dir_inode_operations, proc_ns_dir_operations),
>> #ifdef CONFIG_NET
>> --
>> 1.8.1
>>
>
>
>
> --
> Kees Cook
> Chrome OS Security
--
Andy Lutomirski
AMA Capital Management, LLC
--
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