linux-kernel - [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 061/146] parisc,metag: Fix crashes due to stack randomization on stack-grows-upwards architectures

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Message-Id: <1434579851-1719-62-git-send-email-kamal@canonical.com>
Date:	Wed, 17 Jun 2015 15:22:46 -0700
From:	Kamal Mostafa <kamal@...onical.com>
To:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org,
	kernel-team@...ts.ubuntu.com
Cc:	Helge Deller <deller@....de>, linux-parisc@...r.kernel.org,
	James Hogan <james.hogan@...tec.com>,
	linux-metag@...r.kernel.org, Kamal Mostafa <kamal@...onical.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 061/146] parisc,metag: Fix crashes due to stack randomization on stack-grows-upwards architectures

3.19.8-ckt2 -stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Helge Deller <deller@....de>

commit d045c77c1a69703143a36169c224429c48b9eecd upstream.

On architectures where the stack grows upwards (CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP=y,
currently parisc and metag only) stack randomization sometimes leads to crashes
when the stack ulimit is set to lower values than STACK_RND_MASK (which is 8 MB
by default if not defined in arch-specific headers).

The problem is, that when the stack vm_area_struct is set up in fs/exec.c, the
additional space needed for the stack randomization (as defined by the value of
STACK_RND_MASK) was not taken into account yet and as such, when the stack
randomization code added a random offset to the stack start, the stack
effectively got smaller than what the user defined via rlimit_max(RLIMIT_STACK)
which then sometimes leads to out-of-stack situations and crashes.

This patch fixes it by adding the maximum possible amount of memory (based on
STACK_RND_MASK) which theoretically could be added by the stack randomization
code to the initial stack size. That way, the user-defined stack size is always
guaranteed to be at minimum what is defined via rlimit_max(RLIMIT_STACK).

This bug is currently not visible on the metag architecture, because on metag
STACK_RND_MASK is defined to 0 which effectively disables stack randomization.

The changes to fs/exec.c are inside an "#ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP"
section, so it does not affect other platformws beside those where the
stack grows upwards (parisc and metag).

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@....de>
Cc: linux-parisc@...r.kernel.org
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@...tec.com>
Cc: linux-metag@...r.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@...onical.com>
---
 arch/parisc/include/asm/elf.h   | 4 ++++
 arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c | 3 +++
 fs/exec.c                       | 3 +++
 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/parisc/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/parisc/include/asm/elf.h
index 3391d06..78c9fd3 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/include/asm/elf.h
+++ b/arch/parisc/include/asm/elf.h
@@ -348,6 +348,10 @@ struct pt_regs;	/* forward declaration... */

 #define ELF_HWCAP	0

+#define STACK_RND_MASK	(is_32bit_task() ? \
+				0x7ff >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12) : \
+				0x3ffff >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12))
+
 struct mm_struct;
 extern unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *);
 #define arch_randomize_brk arch_randomize_brk
diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c
index e1ffea2..5aba01a 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c
+++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c
@@ -77,6 +77,9 @@ static unsigned long mmap_upper_limit(void)
 	if (stack_base > STACK_SIZE_MAX)
 		stack_base = STACK_SIZE_MAX;

+	/* Add space for stack randomization. */
+	stack_base += (STACK_RND_MASK << PAGE_SHIFT);
+
 	return PAGE_ALIGN(STACK_TOP - stack_base);
 }

diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 4617a4e..be18722 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -659,6 +659,9 @@ int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 	if (stack_base > STACK_SIZE_MAX)
 		stack_base = STACK_SIZE_MAX;

+	/* Add space for stack randomization. */
+	stack_base += (STACK_RND_MASK << PAGE_SHIFT);
+
 	/* Make sure we didn't let the argument array grow too large. */
 	if (vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start > stack_base)
 		return -ENOMEM;
-- 
1.9.1

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