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Message-ID: <20150618012536.GC8718@dhcp-128-32.nay.redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2015 09:25:36 +0800
From: Dave Young <dyoung@...hat.com>
To: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>,
Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...oraproject.org>,
Eric Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
kexec <kexec@...ts.infradead.org>,
"Linux-Kernel@...r. Kernel. Org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: kexec_load(2) bypasses signature verification
On 06/15/15 at 04:01pm, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 15, 2015 at 09:37:05AM -0400, Josh Boyer wrote:
> > The bits that actually read Secure Boot state out of the UEFI
> > variables, and apply protections to the machine to avoid compromise
> > under the SB threat model. Things like disabling the old kexec...
>
> I don't have any real interest in using Secure Boot, but I *am*
> interested in using CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG[1]. So perhaps we need to
> have something similar to what we have with signed modules in terms of
> CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE and module/sig_enforce, but for
> KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG. This would mean creating a separate flag
> independent of the one Linus suggested for Secure Boot, but since we
> have one for signed modules, we do have precedent for this sort of
> thing.
Agree and vote for this way as I replied in another email about
CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG_FORCE.
Thanks
Dave
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