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Message-ID: <20150618133254.12722.33339.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2015 14:32:54 +0100
From: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
To: sds@...ho.nsa.gov, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, miklos@...redi.hu
Cc: linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, dhowells@...hat.com,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-unionfs@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 5/8] SELinux: Stub in copy-up handling
Provide stubs for union/overlay copy-up handling. The xattr copy up stub
discards lower SELinux xattrs rather than letting them be copied up so that
the security label on the copy doesn't get corrupted.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index ffa5a642629a..c5d893e2ff23 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3200,6 +3200,20 @@ static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
*secid = isec->sid;
}
+static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct dentry *dst)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *src, struct dentry *dst,
+ const char *name, void *value,
+ size_t *size)
+{
+ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
+ return 1; /* Discard */
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* file security operations */
static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
@@ -5917,6 +5931,8 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
.inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
.inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
+ .inode_copy_up = selinux_inode_copy_up,
+ .inode_copy_up_xattr = selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr,
.file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
.file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
--
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