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Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2015 18:17:29 +0200
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@...ibm.com>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Frédéric Weisbecker <fweisbec@...il.com>,
Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@...glemail.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC/INCOMPLETE 01/13] context_tracking: Add
context_tracking_assert_state
* Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 18, 2015 at 4:07 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote:
> > On Thu, Jun 18, 2015 at 2:57 AM, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org> wrote:
> >>
> >> * Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote:
> >>
> >>> On Wed, Jun 17, 2015 at 2:41 AM, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org> wrote:
> >>> >
> >>> > * Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org> wrote:
> >>> >
> >>> >> This will let us sprinkle sanity checks around the kernel without
> >>> >> making too much of a mess.
> >>> >>
> >>> >> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
> >>> >> ---
> >>> >> include/linux/context_tracking.h | 8 ++++++++
> >>> >> 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
> >>> >>
> >>> >> diff --git a/include/linux/context_tracking.h b/include/linux/context_tracking.h
> >>> >> index 2821838256b4..0fbea4b152e1 100644
> >>> >> --- a/include/linux/context_tracking.h
> >>> >> +++ b/include/linux/context_tracking.h
> >>> >> @@ -57,6 +57,13 @@ static inline void context_tracking_task_switch(struct task_struct *prev,
> >>> >> if (context_tracking_is_enabled())
> >>> >> __context_tracking_task_switch(prev, next);
> >>> >> }
> >>> >> +
> >>> >> +static inline void context_tracking_assert_state(enum ctx_state state)
> >>> >> +{
> >>> >> + rcu_lockdep_assert(!context_tracking_is_enabled() ||
> >>> >> + this_cpu_read(context_tracking.state) == state,
> >>> >> + "context tracking state was wrong");
> >>> >> +}
> >>> >
> >>> > Please don't introduce assert() style debug check interfaces!
> >>> >
> >>> > (And RCU should be fixed too I suspect.)
> >>> >
> >>> > They are absolutely horrible on the brain when mixed with WARN_ON() interfaces,
> >>> > which are the dominant runtime check interface in the kernel.
> >>> >
> >>> > Instead make it something like:
> >>> >
> >>> > #define ct_state() (this_cpu_read(context_tracking.state))
> >>> >
> >>> > #define CT_WARN_ON(cond) \
> >>> > WARN_ON(context_tracking_is_enabled() && (cond))
> >>> >
> >>> > and then the debug checks can be written as:
> >>> >
> >>> > CT_WARN_ON(ct_state() != CONTEXT_KERNEL);
> >>> >
> >>> > This is IMHO _far_ more readable than:
> >>> >
> >>> > context_tracking_assert_state(CONTEXT_KERNEL);
> >>> >
> >>> > ok?
> >>> >
> >>> > (Assuming people will accept 'ct/CT' as an abbreviation for context tracking.)
> >>>
> >>> Hmm, ok I guess. The part I don't like is having ct_state() at all on
> >>> non-context-tracking kernels -- it seems like it's asking for trouble.
> >>
> >> Well:
> >>
> >> - if # CONFIG_CONTEXT_TRACKING is not se, then CT_WARN_ON() does nothing.
> >>
> >> - if CONFIG_CONTEXT_TRACKING=y, but !context_tracking_is_enabled(), then
> >> CT_WARN_ON() will evaluate 'cond', but won't calculate it.
> >>
> >> - only if CONFIG_CONTEXT_TRACKING=y && context_tracking_is_enabled() should we
> >> get as far as ct_state() evaluation.
> >>
> >> so I'm not sure I see the problem you are seeing.
> >>
> >>> We could make CT_WARN_ON not even evaluate its argument if
> >>> !CONFIG_CONTEXT_TRACKING, but then we still have ct_state() returning garbage if
> >>> !context_tracking_is_enabled().
> >>
> >> My understanding is that if !context_tracking_is_enabled() then the compiler
> >> should not even try to evaluate the rest. This is why doing a NULL pointer check
> >> like this is safe:
> >
> > I'm fine with everything you just covered. My only objection is that,
> > if ct_state() exists, then someone might call it outside CT_WARN_ON,
> > in which case it will break on non-context-tracking setups.
>
> The more I think about it, the more I dislike ct_state(). We have
> in_atomic(), which is already problematic because the return value
> isn't reliable. ct_state(), if callable on non context-tracking
> kernels, will also be unreliable. I prefer things like
> lockdep_assert_held because they can't be misused.
>
> It would be far too easy for someone to read:
>
> CT_WARN_ON(ct_state() != CONTEXT_KERNEL);
>
> and add:
>
> if (ct_state() == CONTEXT_KERNEL)
> do_something();
>
> and that would be bad.
But ct_state() could be made reliable: if !context_tracking_is_enabled() then it
should return -1 or so.
I.e. we could make it something like:
enum ctx_state {
CONTEXT_DISABLED = -1,
CONTEXT_KERNEL = 0,
CONTEXT_USER = 1,
CONTEXT_GUEST = 2,
} state;
static inline enum ctx_state ct_state(void)
{
if (context_tracking_is_enabled())
return this_cpu_read(context_tracking.state))
return CONTEXT_DISABLED;
}
and then CT_WARN_ON() DTRT.
Thanks,
Ingo
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