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Message-ID: <2412238.IhG4IMMuSs@sifl>
Date: Wed, 08 Jul 2015 16:07:11 -0400
From: Paul Moore <pmoore@...hat.com>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
Paul Osmialowski <p.osmialowsk@...sung.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
Neil Brown <neilb@...e.de>,
Mark Rustad <mark.d.rustad@...el.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Daniel Mack <daniel@...que.org>,
David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@...glemail.com>,
Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>,
Shuah Khan <shuahkh@....samsung.com>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
Karol Lewandowski <k.lewandowsk@...sung.com>,
Lukasz Skalski <l.skalski@...sung.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC 4/8] lsm: smack: smack callbacks for kdbus security hooks
On Wednesday, July 08, 2015 09:38:25 AM Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 7/8/2015 6:42 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > On 07/08/2015 06:25 AM, Paul Osmialowski wrote:
...
> > If Smack only truly needs 3 hooks, then it begs the question of why
> > there are so many other hooks defined. Are the other hooks just to
> > support finer-grained distinctions, or is Smack's coverage incomplete?
>
> I haven't been following kdbus closely for a while, but the original
> intent for Smack and kdbus was that it Smack controls would be on the
> objects involved, and that to accomplish that only a small number of
> hooks would be necessary. After all, Smack uses fewer hooks than SELinux
> on other things. I do agree that without a user there is no point in
> having hooks. If SELinux requires the other hooks we might want to
> hold off on asking for the hooks until the SELinux implementation is
> exposed. I also think that AppArmor should be examined as a potential
> user of the hooks, just to make sure the hooks aren't excessively
> oriented toward subject/object based security modules.
In Paul O.'s defense, we did have some discussion about the reasons for these
hooks, although that seems like ages ago and I would need to dig through the
archives (my inbox?) to find the reasoning for each.
However, I don't remember being very comfortable with the hooks back them
largely due to uncertainty about how we were treating kdbus with respect to
subjects/objects. I think it's worth restarting that discussion now before we
nit pick the patches themselves.
--
paul moore
security @ redhat
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