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Message-ID: <559D51C2.7060603@tycho.nsa.gov>
Date: Wed, 08 Jul 2015 12:37:22 -0400
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
To: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley@...il.com>,
Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com>
CC: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@...hat.com>,
Morten Stevens <mstevens@...oraproject.org>,
Eric Sandeen <esandeen@...hat.com>,
Dave Chinner <david@...morbit.com>,
Daniel Wagner <wagi@...om.org>,
Linux Kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>, linux-mm@...ck.org,
selinux <selinux@...ho.nsa.gov>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: mm: shmem_zero_setup skip security check and lockdep conflict
with XFS
On 07/08/2015 09:13 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Sun, Jun 14, 2015 at 12:48 PM, Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com> wrote:
>> It appears that, at some point last year, XFS made directory handling
>> changes which bring it into lockdep conflict with shmem_zero_setup():
>> it is surprising that mmap() can clone an inode while holding mmap_sem,
>> but that has been so for many years.
>>
>> Since those few lockdep traces that I've seen all implicated selinux,
>> I'm hoping that we can use the __shmem_file_setup(,,,S_PRIVATE) which
>> v3.13's commit c7277090927a ("security: shmem: implement kernel private
>> shmem inodes") introduced to avoid LSM checks on kernel-internal inodes:
>> the mmap("/dev/zero") cloned inode is indeed a kernel-internal detail.
>>
>> This also covers the !CONFIG_SHMEM use of ramfs to support /dev/zero
>> (and MAP_SHARED|MAP_ANONYMOUS). I thought there were also drivers
>> which cloned inode in mmap(), but if so, I cannot locate them now.
>
> This causes a regression for SELinux (please, in the future, cc
> selinux list and Paul Moore on SELinux-related changes). In
> particular, this change disables SELinux checking of mprotect
> PROT_EXEC on shared anonymous mappings, so we lose the ability to
> control executable mappings. That said, we are only getting that
> check today as a side effect of our file execute check on the tmpfs
> inode, whereas it would be better (and more consistent with the
> mmap-time checks) to apply an execmem check in that case, in which
> case we wouldn't care about the inode-based check. However, I am
> unclear on how to correctly detect that situation from
> selinux_file_mprotect() -> file_map_prot_check(), because we do have a
> non-NULL vma->vm_file so we treat it as a file execute check. In
> contrast, if directly creating an anonymous shared mapping with
> PROT_EXEC via mmap(...PROT_EXEC...), selinux_mmap_file is called with
> a NULL file and therefore we end up applying an execmem check.
Also, can you provide the lockdep traces that motivated this change?
>
>>
>> Reported-and-tested-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@...hat.com>
>> Reported-by: Daniel Wagner <wagi@...om.org>
>> Reported-by: Morten Stevens <mstevens@...oraproject.org>
>> Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com>
>> ---
>>
>> mm/shmem.c | 8 +++++++-
>> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> --- 4.1-rc7/mm/shmem.c 2015-04-26 19:16:31.352191298 -0700
>> +++ linux/mm/shmem.c 2015-06-14 09:26:49.461120166 -0700
>> @@ -3401,7 +3401,13 @@ int shmem_zero_setup(struct vm_area_stru
>> struct file *file;
>> loff_t size = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
>>
>> - file = shmem_file_setup("dev/zero", size, vma->vm_flags);
>> + /*
>> + * Cloning a new file under mmap_sem leads to a lock ordering conflict
>> + * between XFS directory reading and selinux: since this file is only
>> + * accessible to the user through its mapping, use S_PRIVATE flag to
>> + * bypass file security, in the same way as shmem_kernel_file_setup().
>> + */
>> + file = __shmem_file_setup("dev/zero", size, vma->vm_flags, S_PRIVATE);
>> if (IS_ERR(file))
>> return PTR_ERR(file);
>>
>> --
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