Message-ID: <CANq1E4TaE6EK1iEGLq_Zhu6=z52VZx7sPFc4TVc1vt1F3pShcA@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Fri, 10 Jul 2015 15:43:08 +0200
From:	David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@...il.com>
To:	Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
Cc:	Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
	Daniel Mack <daniel@...que.org>,
	Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>,
	lkml <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	LSM <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
	Paul Osmialowski <p.osmialowsk@...sung.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
Subject: Re: kdbus: credential faking

Hi

On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 3:25 PM, Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov> wrote:
> On 07/09/2015 06:22 PM, David Herrmann wrote:
>> To be clear, faking metadata has one use-case, and one use-case only:
>> dbus1 compatibility
>>
>> In dbus1, clients connect to a unix-socket placed in the file-system
>> hierarchy. To avoid breaking ABI for old clients, we support a
>> unix-kdbus proxy. This proxy is called systemd-bus-proxyd. It is
>> spawned once for each bus we proxy and simply remarshals messages from
>> the client to kdbus and vice versa.
>
> Is this truly necessary?  Can't the distributions just update the client
> side libraries to use kdbus if enabled and be done with it?  Doesn't
> this proxy undo many of the benefits of using kdbus in the first place?

We need binary compatibility to dbus1. There're millions of
applications and language bindings with dbus1 compiled in, which we
cannot suddenly break.

>> With dbus1, clients can ask the dbus-daemon for the seclabel of a peer
>> they talk to. They're free to use this information for any purpose. On
>> kdbus, we want to be compatible to dbus-daemon. Therefore, if a native
>> client queries kdbus for the seclabel of a peer behind a proxy, we
>> want that query to return the actual seclabel of the peer, not the
>> seclabel of the proxy. Same applies to PIDS and CREDS.
>>
>> This faked metadata is never used by the kernel for any security
>> decisions. It's sole purpose is to return them if a native kdbus
>> client queries another peer. Furthermore, this information is never
>> transmitted as send-time metadata (as it is, in no way, send-time
>> metadata), but only if you explicitly query the connection-time
>> metadata of a peer (KDBUS_CMD_CONN_INFO).
>
> I guess I don't understand the difference.  Is there a separate facility
> for obtaining the send-time metadata that is not subject to credential
> faking?

Each message carries metadata of the sender, that was collected at the
time of _SEND_. This metadata cannot be faked.
Additionally (for introspection and dbus1 compat), kdbus allows peers
to query metadata of other peers, that were collected at the time of
_CONNECT_. Privileged peers can provide faked _connection_ metadata,
which has the side-effect of suppressing send-time metadata.
It is up to the receiver to request connection-metadata if a message
did not carry send-time metadata. We do this, currently, only to
support legacy dbus1 clients which do not support send-time metadata.

>> Regarding requiring CAP_SYS_ADMIN, I don't really see the point. In
>> the kdbus security model, if you don't trust the bus-creator, you
>> should not connect to the bus. A bus-creator can bypass kdbus
>> policies, sniff on any transmission and modify bus behavior. It just
>> seems logical to bind faked-metadata to the same privilege. However, I
>> also have no strong feeling about that, if you place valid points. So
>> please elaborate.
>> But, please be aware that if we require privileges to fake metadata,
>> then you need to have such privileges to provide a dbus1 proxy for
>> your native bus on kdbus. In other words, users are able to create
>> session/user buses, but they need CAP_SYS_ADMIN to spawn the dbus1
>> proxy. This will have the net-effect of us requiring to run the proxy
>> as root (which, I think, is worse than allowing bus-owners to fake
>> _connection_ metadata).
>
> Applications have a reasonable expectation that credentials supplied by
> the kernel for a peer are trustworthy.  Allowing unprivileged users to
> forge arbitrary credentials and pids seems fraught with peril.  You say
> that one should never connect to a bus if you do not trust its creator.
>  What mechanisms are provided to allow me to determine whether I trust
> the bus creator before connecting?  Are those mechanisms automatically
> employed by default?

Regarding the default security model (uid based), each bus is prefixed
by the uid of the bus-owner. This is enforced by the kernel. Hence, a
process cannot 'accidentally' connect to a bus of a user they don't
trust.

Thanks
David
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