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Message-ID: <559FFDDF.2090302@schaufler-ca.com>
Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2015 10:16:15 -0700
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@...il.com>
CC: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Daniel Mack <daniel@...que.org>,
Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>,
lkml <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
LSM <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Paul Osmialowski <p.osmialowsk@...sung.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
Subject: Re: kdbus: credential faking
On 7/10/2015 9:26 AM, David Herrmann wrote:
> Hi
>
> On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 5:59 PM, Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com> wrote:
> [...]
>> There are so many ways uids are being (miss/ab)used
>> on Linux systems these days that the idea of trusting a bus just
>> because its non-root uid is listed in a table somewhere (or worse,
>> coded in an API) is asking for exploits.
> Please elaborate on these possible exploits. I'd also like to hear,
> whether the same applies to the already used '/run/user/<uid>/bus',
> which follows nearly the same model.
Sorry, I'm not the exploit generator guy. If I where, I would
point out that the application expecting the uid to identify
a person is going to behave incorrectly on the system that uses
the uid to identify an application. I never said that I liked
/run/user/<uid>/bus. Come to think of it, I never said I like
dbus, either.
>
> Thanks
> David
>
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