Message-ID: <874ml4c07s.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
Date:	Wed, 15 Jul 2015 21:20:23 -0500
From:	ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To:	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc:	SELinux-NSA <selinux@...ho.nsa.gov>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
	"linux-kernel\@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
	Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
	Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@...onical.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/7] Initial support for user namespace owned mounts

Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> writes:

> On Jul 15, 2015 3:34 PM, "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com> wrote:
>>
>> Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@...onical.com> writes:
>>
>> > On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 04:06:35PM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>> >> Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com> writes:
>> >>
>> >> > On 7/15/2015 12:46 PM, Seth Forshee wrote:
>> >> >> These are the first in a larger set of patches that I've been working on
>> >> >> (with help from Eric Biederman) to support mounting ext4 and fuse
>> >> >> filesystems from within user namespaces. I've pushed the full series to:
>> >> >>
>> >> >>   git://kernel.ubuntu.com/sforshee/linux.git userns-mounts
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Taking the series as a whole, the strategy is to handle as much of the
>> >> >> heavy lifting as possible in the vfs so the filesystems don't have to
>> >> >> handle weird edge cases. If you look at the full series you'll find that
>> >> >> the changes in ext4 to support user namespace mounts turn out to be
>> >> >> fairly minimal (fuse is a bit more complicated though as it must deal
>> >> >> with translating ids for a userspace process which is running in pid and
>> >> >> user namespaces).
>> >> >>
>> >> >> The patches I'm sending today lay some of the groundwork in the vfs and
>> >> >> related code. They fall into two broad groups:
>> >> >>
>> >> >>  1. Patches 1-2 add s_user_ns and simplify MNT_NODEV handling. These are
>> >> >>     pretty straightforward, and Eric has expressed interest in merging
>> >> >>     these patches soon. Note that patch 2 won't apply cleanly without
>> >> >>     Eric's noexec patches for proc and sys [1].
>> >> >>
>> >> >>  2. Patches 2-7 tighten down security for mounts with s_user_ns !=
>> >> >>     &init_user_ns. This includes updates to how file caps and suid are
>> >> >>     handled and LSM updates to ignore security labels on superblocks
>> >> >>     from non-init namespaces.
>> >> >>
>> >> >>     The LSM changes in particular may not be optimal, as I don't have a
>> >> >>     lot of familiarity with this code, so I'd be especially appreciative
>> >> >>     of review of these changes and suggestions on how to improve them.
>> >> >
>> >> > Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@...sung.com> proposed
>> >> > LSM support in user namespaces ([RFC] lsm: namespace hooks)
>> >> > that make a whole lot more sense than just turning off
>> >> > the option of using labels on files. Gutting the ability
>> >> > to use MAC in a namespace is a step down the road of
>> >> > making MAC and namespaces incompatible.
>> >>
>> >> This is not "turning off the option to use labels on files".
>> >>
>> >> This is supporting mounting filesystems like ext4 by unprivileged users
>> >> and not trusting the labels they set in the same way as we trust labels
>> >> on filesystems mounted by privileged users.
>> >>
>> >> The first step needs to be not trusting those labels and treating such
>> >> filesystems as filesystems without label support.  I hope that is Seth
>> >> has implemented.
>> >>
>> >> In the long run we can do more interesting things with such filesystems
>> >> once the appropriate LSM policy is in place.
>> >
>> > Yes, this exactly. Right now it looks to me like the only safe thing to
>> > do with mounts from unprivileged users is to ignore the security labels,
>> > so that's what I'm trying to do with these changes. If there's some
>> > better thing to do, or some better way to do it, I'm more than happy to
>> > receive that feedback.
>>
>> Ugh.
>>
>> This made me realize that we have an interesting problem here.  An
>> unprivileged mount of tmpfs probably needs to have
>> s_user_ns == &init_user_ns.
>>
>> Otherwise we will break security labels on tmpfs for no good reason.
>> ramfs and sysfs also seem to have similar concerns.
>>
>> Because they have no backing store we can trust those filesystems with
>> security labels.  Plus for at least sysfs there is the security label
>> bleed through issue, that we need to make certain works.
>>
>> Perhaps these filesystems with trusted backing store need to call
>> "sget_userns(..., &init_user_ns)".
>>
>> If we don't get this right we will have significant regressions with
>> respect to security labels, and that is not ok.
>
> That's only a problem if there's anyone who sets security labels on
> such a mount.  You need global caps to do that (I hope), which
> requires someone outside the userns to help, which means there's a
> good chance that literally no one does this.

Fair enough.  That is however something we need to test.  If no one
puts security labels or file caps on such a mount we can change things.
If not we can't because it would introduce regressions.

Eric
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