Message-ID: <55AEF75F.9010703@schaufler-ca.com>
Date:	Tue, 21 Jul 2015 18:52:31 -0700
From:	Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To:	Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@...onical.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc:	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
	Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
	LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
	SELinux-NSA <selinux@...ho.nsa.gov>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/7] Initial support for user namespace owned mounts

On 7/21/2015 1:35 PM, Seth Forshee wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 05:59:22PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 5:45 PM, Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com> wrote:
>>> On 7/16/2015 4:29 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>>> I really don't see the benefit of making up extra rules that apply to
>>>> users outside a userns who try to access specifically a filesystem
>>>> with backing store.  They wouldn't make sense for filesystems without
>>>> backing store.
>>> Sure it would. For Smack, it would be the label a file would be
>>> created with, which would be the label of the process creating
>>> the memory based filesystem. For SELinux the rules are more a
>>> touch more sophisticated, but I'm sure that Paul or Stephen could
>>> come up with how to determine it.
>>>
>>> The point, looping all the way back to the beginning, where we
>>> were talking about just ignoring the labels on the filesystem,
>>> is that if you use the same Smack label on the files in the
>>> filesystem as the backing store file has, we'll all be happy.
>>> If that label isn't something user can write to, he won't be
>>> able to write to the mounted objects, either. If there is no
>>> backing store then use the label of the process creating the
>>> filesystem, which will be the user, which will mean everything
>>> will work hunky dory.
>>>
>>> Yes, there's work involved, but I doubt there's a lot. Getting
>>> the label from the backing store or the creating process is
>>> simple enough.
>>>
> So something like the diff below (untested)?

I think that this is close, and quite good for someone
who isn't very familiar with Smack. It's definitely headed
in the right direction.

> All I'm really doing is setting smk_default as you describe above and
> then using it instead of smk_of_current() in
> smack_inode_alloc_security() and instead of the label from the disk in
> smack_d_instantiate().

Let's say your backing store is a file labeled Rubble.

mount -o smackfsroot=Rubble,smackfsdef=Rubble ...

It is completely reasonable for a process labeled Flintstone to
have rwxa access to a file labeled Rubble.

Smack rule: Flintstone Rubble rwxa

In the case of writing to an existing Rubble file, what you
have looks fine. What's not so great is that if the Flintstone
process creates a file, it should be labeled Flintstone. Your
use of the smk_default, which is going to violate the principle
of least astonishment, and break the Smack policy as well.

Let's make a minor change. Instead of using smackfsroot let's
use smackfstransmute and a slightly different access rule:

mount -o smackfstransmute=Rubble,smackfsdef=Rubble ...

Smack rule: Flintstone Rubble rwxat

Now the only change we have to make to the Smack code is
that we don't want to create any files unless either the
process is labeled Rubble or the rule allowing the creation
has the "t" for transmute access. That should ensure that
everything is labeled Rubble. If it isn't, someone has mucked
with the metadata in a detectable way.
 

> Since a user currently needs CAP_MAC_ADMIN in
> init_user_ns to store security labels it looks like this should be
> sufficient. I'm not even sure that the inode_alloc_security hook changes
> are needed.
>
> We could allow privileged users in s_user_ns to write security labels to
> disk since they already control the backing store, as long as Smack
> didn't subsequently import them. I didn't do that here.
>
>> So what if Smack used the label of the user creating the filesystem
>> even for filesystems with backing store?  IMO this ought to be doable
>> with the LSM hooks -- it certainly seems reasonable for the LSM to be
>> aware of who created a filesystem.  In fact, I'd argue that if Smack
>> can't do this with the proposed LSM hooks, then the hooks are
>> insufficient.
> It would be very simple to use the label of the task instead.
>
> Seth
>
> ---
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
> index 32f598db0b0d..4597420ab933 100644
> --- a/include/linux/fs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/fs.h
> @@ -1486,6 +1486,10 @@ static inline void sb_start_intwrite(struct super_block *sb)
>  	__sb_start_write(sb, SB_FREEZE_FS, true);
>  }
>  
> +static inline bool sb_in_userns(struct super_block *sb)
> +{
> +	return sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns;
> +}
>  
>  extern bool inode_owner_or_capable(const struct inode *inode);
>  
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index a143328f75eb..591fd19294e7 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -255,6 +255,10 @@ static struct smack_known *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip,
>  	char *buffer;
>  	struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
>  
> +	/* Should never fetch xattrs from untrusted mounts */
> +	if (WARN_ON(sb_in_userns(ip->i_sb)))
> +		return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
> +

Go ahead and fetch it, we'll check to make sure it's viable later.

>  	if (ip->i_op->getxattr == NULL)
>  		return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
>  
> @@ -656,10 +660,14 @@ static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
>  		 */
>  		if (specified)
>  			return -EPERM;
> +
>  		/*
> -		 * Unprivileged mounts get root and default from the caller.
> +		 * User namespace mounts get root and default from the backing
> +		 * store, if there is one. Other unprivileged mounts get them
> +		 * from the caller.
>  		 */
> -		skp = smk_of_current();
> +		skp = (sb_in_userns(sb) && sb->s_bdev) ?
> +			smk_of_inode(sb->s_bdev->bd_inode) : smk_of_current();
>  		sp->smk_root = skp;
>  		sp->smk_default = skp;

			sp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;

>  	}
> @@ -792,7 +800,12 @@ static int smack_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>   */
>  static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
>  {
> -	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
> +	struct smack_known *skp;
> +
> +	if (sb_in_userns(inode->i_sb))
> +		skp = ((struct superblock_smack *)(inode->i_sb->s_security))->smk_default;
> +	else
> +		skp = smk_of_current();

This should be left alone.
smack_inode_init_security is where you could disallow access that doesn't
legitimately result in a Rubble label on the file. It's something like

	... after the call may = smk_access_entry(...)
	if (sb_in_userns(inode->i_sb))
		if (skp != dsp && (may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) == 0)
			return -EACCES; 

>  	inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(skp);
>  	if (inode->i_security == NULL)
> @@ -3175,6 +3188,11 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
>  			break;
>  		}
>  		/*
> +		 * Don't use labels from xattrs for unprivileged mounts.
> +		 */
> +		if (sb_in_userns(inode->i_sb))
> +			break;
> +		/*

Again, use the label. Just check to make sure it's what you expect.

>  		 * No xattr support means, alas, no SMACK label.
>  		 * Use the aforeapplied default.
>  		 * It would be curious if the label of the task

Also untested.

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