[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <55B3C063.4090106@schaufler-ca.com>
Date: Sat, 25 Jul 2015 09:59:15 -0700
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@...sung.com>,
Sungbae Yoo <sungbae.yoo@...sung.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Smack: replace capable() with ns_capable()
On 7/24/2015 4:40 AM, Lukasz Pawelczyk wrote:
> On piÄ…, 2015-07-24 at 20:26 +0900, Sungbae Yoo wrote:
>> If current task has capabilities, Smack operations (eg. Changing own
>> smack
>> label) should be available even inside of namespace.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Sungbae Yoo <sungbae.yoo@...sung.com>
For the reasons Lukasz outlines below.
Nacked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
>>
>> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c
>> b/security/smack/smack_access.c
>> index 00f6b38..f6b2c35 100644
>> --- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
>> +++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
>> @@ -639,7 +639,7 @@ int smack_privileged(int cap)
>> struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
>> struct smack_onlycap *sop;
>>
>> - if (!capable(cap))
>> + if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), cap))
>> return 0;
> It's not that easy.
>
> With this change Smack becomes completely insecure. You can change
> rules as an unprivileged user without any problems now.
> What you want is Smack namespace that was made to remedy exactly this
> issue (e.g. changing own labels inside a namespace).
>
>>
>> rcu_read_lock();
>> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>> index a143328..7fdc3dd 100644
>> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>> @@ -403,7 +403,8 @@ static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct
>> task_struct *tracer,
>> rc = 0;
>> else if (smack_ptrace_rule ==
>> SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)
>> rc = -EACCES;
>> - else if (capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
>> + else if (ns_capable(__task_cred(tracer)->user_ns,
>> + CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
>> rc = 0;
>> else
>> rc = -EACCES;
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists