lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date:	Wed, 29 Jul 2015 01:41:22 -0400
From:	Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>
To:	x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
	Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@...hat.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: [PATCH 7/8] x86/vm86: Rename vm86->vm86_info to user_vm86

Make it clearer that this is the pointer to the userspace vm86 state area.

Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/vm86.h |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c   | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vm86.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vm86.h
index 05f6394..5c027c5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vm86.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vm86.h
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ struct kernel_vm86_regs {
 };
 
 struct vm86 {
-	struct vm86plus_struct __user *vm86_info;
+	struct vm86plus_struct __user *user_vm86;
 	struct pt_regs regs32;
 	unsigned long v86flags;
 	unsigned long v86mask;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c
index 6fce378..aca499d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c
@@ -104,17 +104,17 @@ void save_v86_state(struct kernel_vm86_regs *regs, int retval)
 	 */
 	local_irq_enable();
 
-	if (!vm86 || !vm86->vm86_info) {
-		pr_alert("no vm86_info: BAD\n");
+	if (!vm86 || !vm86->user_vm86) {
+		pr_alert("no user_vm86: BAD\n");
 		do_exit(SIGSEGV);
 	}
 	set_flags(regs->pt.flags, VEFLAGS, X86_EFLAGS_VIF | vm86->v86mask);
-	user = vm86->vm86_info;
+	user = vm86->user_vm86;
 
 	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, user, vm86->vm86plus.is_vm86pus ?
 		       sizeof(struct vm86plus_struct) :
 		       sizeof(struct vm86_struct))) {
-		pr_alert("could not access userspace vm86_info\n");
+		pr_alert("could not access userspace vm86 info\n");
 		do_exit(SIGSEGV);
 	}
 
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ void save_v86_state(struct kernel_vm86_regs *regs, int retval)
 		put_user_ex(vm86->screen_bitmap, &user->screen_bitmap);
 	} put_user_catch(err);
 	if (err) {
-		pr_alert("could not access userspace vm86_info\n");
+		pr_alert("could not access userspace vm86 info\n");
 		do_exit(SIGSEGV);
 	}
 
@@ -199,11 +199,11 @@ static inline int do_vm86_irq_handling(int subfunction, int irqnumber)
 }
 #endif
 
-static long do_sys_vm86(struct vm86plus_struct __user *v86, bool plus);
+static long do_sys_vm86(struct vm86plus_struct __user *user_vm86, bool plus);
 
-SYSCALL_DEFINE1(vm86old, struct vm86_struct __user *, v86)
+SYSCALL_DEFINE1(vm86old, struct vm86_struct __user *, user_vm86)
 {
-	return do_sys_vm86((struct vm86plus_struct __user *) v86, false);
+	return do_sys_vm86((struct vm86plus_struct __user *) user_vm86, false);
 }
 
 
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(vm86, unsigned long, cmd, unsigned long, arg)
 }
 
 
-static long do_sys_vm86(struct vm86plus_struct __user *v86, bool plus)
+static long do_sys_vm86(struct vm86plus_struct __user *user_vm86, bool plus)
 {
 	struct tss_struct *tss;
 	struct task_struct *tsk = current;
@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ static long do_sys_vm86(struct vm86plus_struct __user *v86, bool plus)
 	if (vm86->saved_sp0)
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, v86, plus ?
+	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, user_vm86, plus ?
 		       sizeof(struct vm86_struct) :
 		       sizeof(struct vm86plus_struct)))
 		return -EFAULT;
@@ -255,40 +255,42 @@ static long do_sys_vm86(struct vm86plus_struct __user *v86, bool plus)
 	memset(&vm86regs, 0, sizeof(vm86regs));
 	get_user_try {
 		unsigned short seg;
-		get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.bx, &v86->regs.ebx);
-		get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.cx, &v86->regs.ecx);
-		get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.dx, &v86->regs.edx);
-		get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.si, &v86->regs.esi);
-		get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.di, &v86->regs.edi);
-		get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.bp, &v86->regs.ebp);
-		get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.ax, &v86->regs.eax);
-		get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.ip, &v86->regs.eip);
-		get_user_ex(seg, &v86->regs.cs);
+		get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.bx, &user_vm86->regs.ebx);
+		get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.cx, &user_vm86->regs.ecx);
+		get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.dx, &user_vm86->regs.edx);
+		get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.si, &user_vm86->regs.esi);
+		get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.di, &user_vm86->regs.edi);
+		get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.bp, &user_vm86->regs.ebp);
+		get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.ax, &user_vm86->regs.eax);
+		get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.ip, &user_vm86->regs.eip);
+		get_user_ex(seg, &user_vm86->regs.cs);
 		vm86regs.pt.cs = seg;
-		get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.flags, &v86->regs.eflags);
-		get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.sp, &v86->regs.esp);
-		get_user_ex(seg, &v86->regs.ss);
+		get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.flags, &user_vm86->regs.eflags);
+		get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.sp, &user_vm86->regs.esp);
+		get_user_ex(seg, &user_vm86->regs.ss);
 		vm86regs.pt.ss = seg;
-		get_user_ex(vm86regs.es, &v86->regs.es);
-		get_user_ex(vm86regs.ds, &v86->regs.ds);
-		get_user_ex(vm86regs.fs, &v86->regs.fs);
-		get_user_ex(vm86regs.gs, &v86->regs.gs);
-
-		get_user_ex(vm86->flags, &v86->flags);
-		get_user_ex(vm86->screen_bitmap, &v86->screen_bitmap);
-		get_user_ex(vm86->cpu_type, &v86->cpu_type);
+		get_user_ex(vm86regs.es, &user_vm86->regs.es);
+		get_user_ex(vm86regs.ds, &user_vm86->regs.ds);
+		get_user_ex(vm86regs.fs, &user_vm86->regs.fs);
+		get_user_ex(vm86regs.gs, &user_vm86->regs.gs);
+
+		get_user_ex(vm86->flags, &user_vm86->flags);
+		get_user_ex(vm86->screen_bitmap, &user_vm86->screen_bitmap);
+		get_user_ex(vm86->cpu_type, &user_vm86->cpu_type);
 	} get_user_catch(err);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
-	if (copy_from_user(&vm86->int_revectored, &v86->int_revectored,
+	if (copy_from_user(&vm86->int_revectored,
+			   &user_vm86->int_revectored,
 			   sizeof(struct revectored_struct)))
 		return -EFAULT;
-	if (copy_from_user(&vm86->int21_revectored, &v86->int21_revectored,
+	if (copy_from_user(&vm86->int21_revectored,
+			   &user_vm86->int21_revectored,
 			   sizeof(struct revectored_struct)))
 		return -EFAULT;
 	if (plus) {
-		if (copy_from_user(&vm86->vm86plus, &v86->vm86plus,
+		if (copy_from_user(&vm86->vm86plus, &user_vm86->vm86plus,
 				   sizeof(struct vm86plus_info_struct)))
 			return -EFAULT;
 		vm86->vm86plus.is_vm86pus = 1;
@@ -297,7 +299,7 @@ static long do_sys_vm86(struct vm86plus_struct __user *v86, bool plus)
 		       sizeof(struct vm86plus_info_struct));
 
 	memcpy(&vm86->regs32, regs, sizeof(struct pt_regs));
-	vm86->vm86_info = v86;
+	vm86->user_vm86 = user_vm86;
 
 /*
  * The flags register is also special: we cannot trust that the user
-- 
2.4.3

--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/

Powered by blists - more mailing lists