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Message-ID: <55B957DE.60405@cantab.net>
Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2015 23:46:54 +0100
From: David Vrabel <dvrabel@...tab.net>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
CC: "security@...nel.org" <security@...nel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
xen-devel <xen-devel@...ts.xen.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
David Vrabel <david.vrabel@...rix.com>,
Jan Beulich <jbeulich@...e.com>,
Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@...cle.com>,
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>
Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4 0/3] x86: modify_ldt improvement, test,
and config option
On 29/07/2015 23:11, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 29/07/2015 23:05, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> On Wed, Jul 29, 2015 at 2:37 PM, Andrew Cooper
>> <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com> wrote:
>>> On 29/07/2015 22:26, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>>> On Wed, Jul 29, 2015 at 2:23 PM, Boris Ostrovsky
>>>> <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com> wrote:
>>>>> On 07/29/2015 03:03 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>>>>>> On 29/07/15 15:43, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
>>>>>>> FYI, I have got a repro now and am investigating.
>>>>>> Good and bad news. This bug has nothing to do with LDTs themselves.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I have worked out what is going on, but this:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c
>>>>>> index 5abeaac..7e1a82e 100644
>>>>>> --- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c
>>>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c
>>>>>> @@ -493,6 +493,7 @@ static void set_aliased_prot(void *v, pgprot_t prot)
>>>>>> pte = pfn_pte(pfn, prot);
>>>>>> + (void)*(volatile int*)v;
>>>>>> if (HYPERVISOR_update_va_mapping((unsigned long)v, pte, 0)) {
>>>>>> pr_err("set_aliased_prot va update failed w/ lazy mode
>>>>>> %u\n", paravirt_get_lazy_mode());
>>>>>> BUG();
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Is perhaps not the fix we are looking for, and every use of
>>>>>> HYPERVISOR_update_va_mapping() is susceptible to the same problem.
>>>>> I think in most cases we know that page is mapped so hopefully this is the
>>>>> only site that we need to be careful about.
>>>> Is there any chance we can get some kind of quick-and-dirty fix that
>>>> can go to x86/urgent in the next few days even if a clean fix isn't
>>>> available yet?
>>> Quick and dirty?
>>>
>>> Reading from v is the most obvious and quick way, for areas where we are
>>> certain v exists, is kernel memory and is expected to have a backing
>>> page. I don't know offhand how many of current
>>> HYPERVISOR_update_va_mapping() callsites this applies to.
>> __get_user((char *)v, tmp), perhaps, unless there's something better
>> in the wings. Keep in mind that we need this for -stable, and it's
>> likely to get backported quite quickly due to CVE-2015-5157.
>
> Hmm - something like that tucked inside HYPERVISOR_update_va_mapping()
> would probably work, and certainly be minimal hassle for -stable.
>
> Altering the hypercall used is certainly not something to backport, nor
> are we sure it is a viable fix at this time.
Changing this one use of update_va_mapping to use mmu_update_normal_pt
is the correct fix to unblock this LDT series. I see no reason why this
cannot be backported.
We can address any other potential update_va_mapping calls at a later
date (if they are shown to be problematic).
David
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