linux-kernel - [PATCH 6/9] KVM: MMU: introduce the framework to check reserved bits on sptes

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Message-Id: <1438685961-8107-7-git-send-email-guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com>
Date:	Tue,  4 Aug 2015 18:59:18 +0800
From:	Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@...ux.intel.com>
To:	pbonzini@...hat.com
Cc:	gleb@...nel.org, mtosatti@...hat.com, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH 6/9] KVM: MMU: introduce the framework to check reserved bits on sptes

We have abstracted the data struct and functions which are used to check
reserved bit on guest page tables, now we extend the logic to check
reserved bits on shadow page tables

Signed-off-by: Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@...ux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |  1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c              | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h              |  3 +++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c              |  1 +
 4 files changed, 56 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 3e33c0d..8356259 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -294,6 +294,7 @@ struct kvm_mmu {
 
 	u64 *pae_root;
 	u64 *lm_root;
+	struct rsvd_bits_validate shadow_rsvd_check;
 	struct rsvd_bits_validate guest_rsvd_check;
 
 	/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
index d11d212..50fbc14 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
@@ -3699,6 +3699,54 @@ static void reset_rsvds_bits_mask_ept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 				    cpuid_maxphyaddr(vcpu), execonly);
 }
 
+/*
+ * the page table on host is the shadow page table for the page
+ * table in guest or amd nested guest, its mmu features completely
+ * follow the features in guest.
+ */
+void
+reset_shadow_rsvds_bits_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *context)
+{
+	__reset_rsvds_bits_mask(vcpu, &context->shadow_rsvd_check,
+				boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits,
+				context->shadow_root_level, context->nx,
+				guest_cpuid_has_gbpages(vcpu), is_pse(vcpu));
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(reset_shadow_rsvds_bits_mask);
+
+/*
+ * the direct page table on host, use as much mmu features as
+ * possible, however, kvm currently does not do execution-protection.
+ */
+static void
+reset_tdp_shadow_rsvds_bits_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				 struct kvm_mmu *context)
+{
+	if (guest_cpuid_is_amd(vcpu))
+		__reset_rsvds_bits_mask(vcpu, &context->shadow_rsvd_check,
+					boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits,
+					context->shadow_root_level, false,
+					cpu_has_gbpages, true);
+	else
+		__reset_rsvds_bits_mask_ept(&context->shadow_rsvd_check,
+					    boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits,
+					    false);
+
+}
+
+/*
+ * as the comments in reset_shadow_rsvds_bits_mask() except it
+ * is the shadow page table for intel nested guest.
+ */
+static void
+reset_ept_shadow_rsvds_bits_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				 struct kvm_mmu *context,
+				 bool execonly)
+{
+	__reset_rsvds_bits_mask_ept(&context->shadow_rsvd_check,
+				    boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits, execonly);
+}
+
 static void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 				      struct kvm_mmu *mmu, bool ept)
 {
@@ -3877,6 +3925,7 @@ static void init_kvm_tdp_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 	update_permission_bitmask(vcpu, context, false);
 	update_last_pte_bitmap(vcpu, context);
+	reset_tdp_shadow_rsvds_bits_mask(vcpu, context);
 }
 
 void kvm_init_shadow_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -3904,6 +3953,7 @@ void kvm_init_shadow_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	context->base_role.smap_andnot_wp
 		= smap && !is_write_protection(vcpu);
 	context->base_role.smm = is_smm(vcpu);
+	reset_shadow_rsvds_bits_mask(vcpu, context);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_init_shadow_mmu);
 
@@ -3927,6 +3977,7 @@ void kvm_init_shadow_ept_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool execonly)
 
 	update_permission_bitmask(vcpu, context, true);
 	reset_rsvds_bits_mask_ept(vcpu, context, execonly);
+	reset_ept_shadow_rsvds_bits_mask(vcpu, context, execonly);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_init_shadow_ept_mmu);
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
index 398d21c..96563be 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
@@ -53,6 +53,9 @@ static inline u64 rsvd_bits(int s, int e)
 int kvm_mmu_get_spte_hierarchy(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, u64 sptes[4]);
 void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(u64 mmio_mask);
 
+void
+reset_shadow_rsvds_bits_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *context);
+
 /*
  * Return values of handle_mmio_page_fault_common:
  * RET_MMIO_PF_EMULATE: it is a real mmio page fault, emulate the instruction
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 568cd0f..1de4685 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -2107,6 +2107,7 @@ static void nested_svm_init_mmu_context(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	vcpu->arch.mmu.get_pdptr         = nested_svm_get_tdp_pdptr;
 	vcpu->arch.mmu.inject_page_fault = nested_svm_inject_npf_exit;
 	vcpu->arch.mmu.shadow_root_level = get_npt_level();
+	reset_shadow_rsvds_bits_mask(vcpu, &vcpu->arch.mmu);
 	vcpu->arch.walk_mmu              = &vcpu->arch.nested_mmu;
 }
 
-- 
2.1.0

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