| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-Id: <9E41D070-24A2-48B8-9AF2-47B575228BF1@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2015 11:30:28 +0800
From: yalin wang <yalin.wang2010@...il.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, dave@...1.net,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>, fabf@...net.be,
bhe@...hat.com, open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC] kcore:change kcore_read to make sure the kernel read is safe
> On Aug 5, 2015, at 06:38, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
>
> On Tue, 4 Aug 2015 11:37:57 +0800 yalin wang <yalin.wang2010@...il.com> wrote:
>
>> This change kcore_read() to use __copy_from_user_inatomic() to
>> copy data from kernel address, because kern_addr_valid() just make sure
>> page table is valid during call it, whne it return, the page table may
>> change, for example, like set_fixmap() function will change kernel page
>> table, then maybe trigger kernel crash if encounter this unluckily.
>
> The changelog is a bit hard to follow. How does this version look?
>
> : read_kcore() does a copy_to_user() from kernel memory. This could cause a
> : crash if the source (kernel) address is concurrently unmapped via, say,
> : set_fixmap(). The kern_addr_valid() check is racy and won't reliably
> : prevent this.
> :
> : Change kcore_read() to use __copy_from_user_inatomic() via a temporary
> : buffer to catch such situations.
>
> What actually happens when copy_to_user() gets a fault on the source
> address? It *could* handle it and return -EFAULT. I forget...
>
> Also... what is special about this particular copy_to_user()? Isn't
> every copy_to_user() in the kernel vulnerable to a concurrent
> set_fixmap()? Is it that only read_kcore() will read pages which are
> subject to set_fixmap() alteration?
>
Thanks for your great comment .
i agree with your git change log,
one more question, at first i only focus on arm64 arch,
it only check __user* address during copy_from{to}_user,
but other architecther like X86 check both source and dest address
in copy_from{to}_user, is there some special reason do like this?
in my view , just need check __user* address is enough, and if also
have ex_table for kernel address access maybe hide some BUG in kernel ,
i think kernel don’t need it, or am i miss something ?
if copy_from{to}_user both check source and dest address,
we don’t need this patch, it is safe .
Maybe we need one more API , like:
copy_data_in_user(__user *source, __user *dest, size_t size) ??
>> --- a/fs/proc/kcore.c
>> +++ b/fs/proc/kcore.c
>> @@ -86,8 +86,8 @@ static size_t get_kcore_size(int *nphdr, size_t *elf_buflen)
>> size = try;
>> *nphdr = *nphdr + 1;
>> }
>> - *elf_buflen = sizeof(struct elfhdr) +
>> - (*nphdr + 2)*sizeof(struct elf_phdr) +
>> + *elf_buflen = sizeof(struct elfhdr) +
>> + (*nphdr + 2)*sizeof(struct elf_phdr) +
>
> Unrelated whitespace fixes really shouldn't be in here. They don't
> bother me too much, but some people get upset ;)
>
i will seperate in another patch for format correctness.
>> 3 * ((sizeof(struct elf_note)) +
>> roundup(sizeof(CORE_STR), 4)) +
>> roundup(sizeof(struct elf_prstatus), 4) +
>> @@ -435,6 +435,7 @@ read_kcore(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen, loff_t *fpos)
>> size_t elf_buflen;
>> int nphdr;
>> unsigned long start;
>> + unsigned long page = 0;
>
> "page" isn't a very good name - when we see that identifier we expect
> it to be a `struct page *'. Maybe call it copy_buf or something.
>
> (And incoming argument "buffer" was poorly named. "buffer" implies some
> temporary intermediate thing, which is inappropriate here!)
>
will change name.
>> read_lock(&kclist_lock);
>> size = get_kcore_size(&nphdr, &elf_buflen);
>> @@ -485,7 +486,7 @@ read_kcore(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen, loff_t *fpos)
>> start = kc_offset_to_vaddr(*fpos - elf_buflen);
>> if ((tsz = (PAGE_SIZE - (start & ~PAGE_MASK))) > buflen)
>> tsz = buflen;
>> -
>> +
>> while (buflen) {
>> struct kcore_list *m;
>>
>> @@ -515,15 +516,32 @@ read_kcore(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen, loff_t *fpos)
>> } else {
>> if (kern_addr_valid(start)) {
>
> Do we still need the (racy) kern_addr_valid() test? The code should
> work OK if this is removed?
>
Yes, can remove
>> unsigned long n;
>> + mm_segment_t old_fs = get_fs();
>> +
>> + if (page == 0) {
>> + page = __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
>> + if (page == 0)
>> + return -ENOMEM;
>>
>> - n = copy_to_user(buffer, (char *)start, tsz);
>> + }
>> + set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
>> + pagefault_disable();
>> + n = __copy_from_user_inatomic((void *)page,
>> + (__force const void __user *)start,
>> + tsz);
>> + pagefault_enable();
>> + set_fs(old_fs);
>
> We should have a code comment in here telling people what's going on.
> A concurrent set_fixmap() on the source memory is unexpected!
Ok.
>
>> + if (n)
>> + memset((void *)page + tsz - n, 0, n);
>> +
>> + n = copy_to_user(buffer, (char *)page, tsz);
>> /*
>> * We cannot distinguish between fault on source
>> * and fault on destination. When this happens
>> * we clear too and hope it will trigger the
>> * EFAULT again.
>> */
>> - if (n) {
>> + if (n) {
>> if (clear_user(buffer + tsz - n,
>> n))
>> return -EFAULT;
>> @@ -540,7 +558,7 @@ read_kcore(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen, loff_t *fpos)
>> start += tsz;
>> tsz = (buflen > PAGE_SIZE ? PAGE_SIZE : buflen);
>> }
>> -
>> + free_page(page);
>> return acc;
>> }
>
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists