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Message-ID: <CALCETrW4FaRTvCoMoZ4uUGu5zux2Mw-AhtELh-ZJ1K-LcdpyWw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 9 Aug 2015 19:42:58 -0700
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To: "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@...il.com>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Subject: kdbus_proc_permission (Re: [GIT PULL] kdbus updates for Greg)
I spotted this:
+/**
+ * kdbus_proc_permission() - check /proc permissions on target pid
+ * @pid_ns: namespace we operate in
+ * @cred: credentials of requestor
+ * @target: target process
+ *
+ * This checks whether a process with credentials @cred can access information
+ * of @target in the namespace @pid_ns. This tries to follow /proc permissions,
+ * but is slightly more restrictive.
+ *
+ * Return: The /proc access level (KDBUS_META_PROC_*) is returned.
+ */
+static unsigned int kdbus_proc_permission(const struct pid_namespace *pid_ns,
+ const struct cred *cred,
+ struct pid *target)
That code ended up in a pull request, although AFAICT it was never in
any patch email sent to me or to any public mailing list. I suspect
it was at least partially a response to one of my old reviews.
I haven't checked the context in which it's used, but in order for
kdbus_proc_permission to do what it claims to do, it appears to be
missing calls to security_inode_permission and
security_file_permission.
--Andy
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