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Message-ID: <20150810153116.GA5667@potion.brq.redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2015 17:31:17 +0200
From: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
dgilbert@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: x86: zero IDT limit on entry to SMM
2015-08-07 12:54+0200, Paolo Bonzini:
> The recent BlackHat 2015 presentation "The Memory Sinkhole"
> mentions that the IDT limit is zeroed on entry to SMM.
Slide 64 of
https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Domas-The-Memory-Sinkhole-Unleashing-An-x86-Design-Flaw-Allowing-Universal-Privilege-Escalation.pdf
> This is not documented, and must have changed some time after 2010
> (see http://www.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/IMG/pdf/IT_Defense_2010_final.pdf).
> KVM was not doing it, but the fix is easy.
This patch also clears the IDT base. Fetching original IDT is better
done from SMM saved state (and an anti-exploit based on comparing those
two seems unlikely) so it should be fine,
Reviewed-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
> ---
That takes care of Attack 1.
KVM is likely not vulnerable to attack 2 and 3 because of an emergent
security feature. (A simple modification of kvm-unit-tests show that
mapping APIC base on top of real code/data makes the APIC page hidden
and I expect SMM memslot to behave similarly.)
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