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Message-Id: <1439458366-8223-4-git-send-email-drysdale@google.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2015 10:32:46 +0100
From: David Drysdale <drysdale@...gle.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Meredydd Luff <meredydd@...atehouse.org>,
Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@...gle.com>,
Ricky Zhou <rickyz@...gle.com>,
Lee Campbell <leecam@...gle.com>,
Julien Tinnes <jln@...gle.com>,
Mike Depinet <mdepinet@...gle.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
Dave Chinner <david@...morbit.com>, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, fstests@...r.kernel.org,
David Drysdale <drysdale@...gle.com>
Subject: [PATCHv4 man-pages 3/3] open.2: describe O_BENEATH flag
Signed-off-by: David Drysdale <drysdale@...gle.com>
---
man2/open.2 | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 44 insertions(+)
diff --git a/man2/open.2 b/man2/open.2
index f49ab3042161..d09511f9ffb0 100644
--- a/man2/open.2
+++ b/man2/open.2
@@ -201,6 +201,43 @@ See
for further details.
See also BUGS, below.
.TP
+.B O_BENEATH " (since Linux 4.??)"
+Ensure that the
+.I pathname
+is beneath the current working directory (for
+.BR open (2))
+or the
+.I dirfd
+(for
+.BR openat (2)).
+If the
+.I pathname
+is absolute or contains a path component of "..", the
+.BR open ()
+fails with the error
+.BR EPERM.
+This occurs even if ".." path component would not actually
+escape the original directory; for example, a
+.I pathname
+of "subdir/../filename" would be rejected.
+Path components that are symbolic links to absolute paths, or that are
+relative paths containing a ".." component, will also cause the
+.BR open ()
+operation to fail with the error
+.BR EPERM.
+
+This feature allows applications to be sure that the opened file is
+within the specified directory, regardless of the original source of the
+.I pathname
+argument.
+Some security-conscious programs may further ensure
+this by imposing a system call filter (with
+.BR seccomp (2))
+that requires this flag for all
+.BR open ()
+operations, so that the program cannot open files outside of
+specified directories even if subverted.
+.TP
.BR O_CLOEXEC " (since Linux 2.6.23)"
.\" NOTE! several other man pages refer to this text
Enable the close-on-exec flag for the new file descriptor.
@@ -1015,6 +1052,13 @@ did not match the owner of the file and the caller was not privileged
The operation was prevented by a file seal; see
.BR fcntl (2).
.TP
+.B EPERM
+The
+.B O_BENEATH
+flag was specified and the
+.I pathname
+was not beneath the relevant directory.
+.TP
.B EROFS
.I pathname
refers to a file on a read-only filesystem and write access was
--
2.5.0.rc2.392.g76e840b
--
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