[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <10795.1439475796@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2015 15:23:16 +0100
From: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
To: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@...el.com>
Cc: dhowells@...hat.com, herbert@...dor.apana.org.au,
keescook@...omium.org, jwboyer@...hat.com, smueller@...onox.de,
richard@....at, steved@...hat.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, james.l.morris@...cle.com,
jkosina@...e.cz, zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, davem@...emloft.net,
vgoyal@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] crypto: KEYS: convert public key to the akcipher API
Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@...el.com> wrote:
> const char *const pkey_algo_name[PKEY_ALGO__LAST] = {
> - [PKEY_ALGO_DSA] = "DSA",
> - [PKEY_ALGO_RSA] = "RSA",
> + [PKEY_ALGO_DSA] = "dsa",
> + [PKEY_ALGO_RSA] = "rsa",
> };
Be aware that these are exposed to userspace through /proc. The change
probably doesn't matter, but you might need to update the documentation.
> +int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey,
> const struct public_key_signature *sig)
> {
> ...
> - return algo->verify_signature(pk, sig);
> + return rsa_pkcs1_v1_5_verify_signature(pkey, sig);
> }
No. You can't assume RSA here. It's quite likely we'll have to support ECDSA
or similar soon. This must be contingent on the algorithm selected.
> {
> const struct public_key *pk = key->payload.data;
> +
> return public_key_verify_signature(pk, sig);
> }
That's nothing to do with this patch.
> +static int rsa_signture_verify(const u8 *H, const u8 *EM, size_t k,
'signture' -> 'signature'.
> +/*
> + * Perform the RSA signature verification.
> + * @H: Value of hash of data and metadata
> + * @EM: The computed signature value
> + * @k: The size of EM (EM[0] is an invalid location but should hold 0x00)
> + * @hash_size: The size of H
> + * @asn1_template: The DigestInfo ASN.1 template
> + * @asn1_size: Size of asm1_template[]
> + */
> +static int rsa_signture_verify(const u8 *H, const u8 *EM, size_t k,
> + size_t hash_size, const u8 *asn1_template,
> + size_t asn1_size)
> +{
Why is this here and not in crypto/rsa.c?
> + /* initlialzie out buf */
'initialise'.
> - /* Decode the public key */
> - ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&x509_rsakey_decoder, ctx,
> - ctx->key, ctx->key_size);
> - if (ret < 0)
> + cert->pub->key = kmemdup(ctx->key, ctx->key_size, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!cert->pub->key)
> goto error_decode;
The generic public key code should *not* see the container wrappings (ASN.1
from an X.509 cert in this case). The public key could be supplied by OpenPGP
instead, for example, or directly by a driver.
Further, at this point, we need to make sure that the data we were given has
the right bits and emit EBADMSG if it doesn't.
Okay, I can accept that the public_key struct might just have a list of void *
and size_t fields that get filled in, one for each integer that we extract
rather than MPIs, but we should not expose the generic code to the stuff we've
parsed away.
> struct public_key {
> - const struct public_key_algorithm *algo;
> - u8 capabilities;
> -#define PKEY_CAN_ENCRYPT 0x01
> -#define PKEY_CAN_DECRYPT 0x02
> -#define PKEY_CAN_SIGN 0x04
> -#define PKEY_CAN_VERIFY 0x08
You still need the capabilities. The X.509 certificate and the OpenPGP
message indicate restrictions on the key that we need to honour.
David
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists