linux-kernel - [PATCH 2/2] perf/x86/intel/bts: Disallow use by unprivileged users on paranoid systems

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Message-Id: <1440688422-27954-3-git-send-email-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Date:	Thu, 27 Aug 2015 18:13:42 +0300
From:	Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>
To:	Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>
Cc:	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...radead.org>,
	Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] perf/x86/intel/bts: Disallow use by unprivileged users on paranoid systems

BTS leaks kernel addresses even in userspace-only mode due to imprecise IP
sampling, so sometimes syscall entry points or page fault handler addresses
end up in a userspace trace.

Now, intel_bts driver exports trace data zero-copy, it does not scan through
it to filter out the kernel addresses and it's would be a O(n) job.

To work around this situation, this patch forbids the use of intel_bts
driver by unprivileged users with paranoid setting higher than 1, which
forbids kernel tracing.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_bts.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_bts.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_bts.c
index 80df16e020..4f6daff92d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_bts.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_bts.c
@@ -495,6 +495,16 @@ static int bts_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
 	if (x86_add_exclusive(x86_lbr_exclusive_bts))
 		return -EBUSY;
 
+	/*
+	 * BTS leaks kernel addresses even when CPL0 tracing is
+	 * disabled, so disallow intel_bts driver for unprivileged
+	 * users on paranoid systems since it provides trace data
+	 * to the user in a zero-copy fashion.
+	 */
+	if (event->attr.exclude_kernel && perf_paranoid_kernel() &&
+	    !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		return -EACCES;
+
 	ret = x86_reserve_hardware();
 	if (ret) {
 		x86_del_exclusive(x86_lbr_exclusive_bts);
-- 
2.5.0

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