Date:	Thu, 27 Aug 2015 19:56:47 -0400
From:	Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
To:	"Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@...e.com>
Cc:	David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
	David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
	"Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@...el.com>,
	"linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org" 
	<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-wireless@...r.kernel.org,
	"james.l.morris@...cle.com" <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
	"serge@...lyn.com" <serge@...lyn.com>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>, selinux@...ho.nsa.gov,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
	"Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@...el.com>,
	"Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@...not-panic.com>,
	Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
	Peter Jones <pjones@...hat.com>, Takashi Iwai <tiwai@...e.de>,
	Ming Lei <ming.lei@...onical.com>, Joey Lee <jlee@...e.de>,
	Vojtěch Pavlík <vojtech@...e.com>,
	Kyle McMartin <kyle@...nel.org>,
	Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@...onical.com>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>,
	Johannes Berg <johannes@...solutions.net>
Subject: Re: Linux Firmware Signing

On Thu, Aug 27, 2015 at 5:29 PM, Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@...e.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 27, 2015 at 10:57:23AM -0000, David Woodhouse wrote:
>
> SELinux uses: security_load_policy(data, len), refer to selinuxfs sel_load_ops.
> Since its write operation on its file_operation is sel_write_load() and that
> is as follows:
>
> static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
>                               size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
> {
>         ...
> }
>
> We should be able to add yet-another LSM hook here to let the kernel / LSM have
> access to the inode, is that LSM hook desirable ? But folks, before you answer
> note that there's a growing trend here! Its point 1 Kees had made earlier.  I
> was hesitant to go into details as I think fw signing needs to be baked first
> but.. since we're reviewing all these details now it seems logical to go down
> the rabbit hole further.
>
> Everywhere where we fetch a file from within the kernel either directly (say
> firmware load, 802.11 regulatory request) or from userspace request (SELinux
> policy load node) we end up having to sprinkle a new LSM hook. In fact for
> modules and kexec there were syscalls added too. There might be a possiblity
> for sharing some of these requests / code so some review is in order for it.
>
> Here's my review if we wanted to try sharing things, in consideration and
> review of:
>
>   * SELinux policy files
>   * modules
>   * firmware / system data (consider replacing CRDA)
>   * kexec
>
> ----
>
>   * SELinux policy files:
>
> sel_write_load() is very specific, its part of the selinuxfs and it just
> uses copy_from_user() to dump the data from the file onto a vmalloc'd
> piece of memory. We don't exactly read arbitrary files from the fs then.
> If we *really* wanted to generalize things further we probably could
> but I'm not going to lead any discussion about design over selinuxfs,
> I'll let the folks behind it think about that themselves.

While I question the usefulness of a SELinux policy signature in the
general case, there are some situations where it might make sense,
e.g. embedded systems with no post-build customizations, and I'm not
opposed to added a signature to the policy file for that reason.
However, I haven't given any serious thought yet to how we would
structure the new blob format so as to support both signed/unsigned
policies as well as existing policies which predate any PKCS #7
changes.

-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
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