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Message-ID: <CAKgNAkhRhr6xYHd6do1L9YMWVVHcS1-YnhLviXibMYR3aeu+DA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 2015 14:10:47 +0200
From: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@...il.com>
To: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@...onical.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...allels.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
lkml <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 5/5] seccomp: add a way to attach a filter via eBPF fd
On 11 September 2015 at 02:21, Tycho Andersen
<tycho.andersen@...onical.com> wrote:
> This is the final bit needed to support seccomp filters created via the bpf
> syscall. The patch adds a new seccomp operation SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER_EBPF,
> which takes exactly one command (presumably to be expanded upon later when
> seccomp EBPFs support more interesting things) and an argument struct
> similar to that of bpf(), although the size is explicit in the struct to
> avoid changing the signature of seccomp().
>
> v2: Don't abuse seccomp's third argument; use a separate command and a
> pointer to a structure instead.
Hi Tycho,
Here, I'm entering broken record territory :-). Seems like a man-pages
patch is warranted here also?
Cheers,
Michael
> Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@...onical.com>
> CC: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> CC: Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>
> CC: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
> CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
> CC: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...allels.com>
> CC: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com>
> CC: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>
> CC: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
> ---
> include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h | 16 +++++
> kernel/seccomp.c | 135 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
> 2 files changed, 138 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
> index 0f238a4..a8694e2 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
> @@ -13,10 +13,14 @@
> /* Valid operations for seccomp syscall. */
> #define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT 0
> #define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER 1
> +#define SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER_EBPF 2
>
> /* Valid flags for SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER */
> #define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC 1
>
> +/* Valid cmds for SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER_EBPF */
> +#define SECCOMP_EBPF_ADD_FD 0
> +
> /*
> * All BPF programs must return a 32-bit value.
> * The bottom 16-bits are for optional return data.
> @@ -51,4 +55,16 @@ struct seccomp_data {
> __u64 args[6];
> };
>
> +struct seccomp_ebpf {
> + unsigned int size;
> +
> + union {
> + /* SECCOMP_EBPF_ADD_FD */
> + struct {
> + unsigned int add_flags;
> + __u32 add_fd;
> + };
> + };
> +};
> +
> #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_SECCOMP_H */
> diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
> index 1856f69..e78175a 100644
> --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
> +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
> @@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ struct seccomp_filter {
> /* Limit any path through the tree to 256KB worth of instructions. */
> #define MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH ((1 << 18) / sizeof(struct sock_filter))
>
> +static long seccomp_install_filter(unsigned int flags,
> + struct seccomp_filter *prepared);
> +
> /*
> * Endianness is explicitly ignored and left for BPF program authors to manage
> * as per the specific architecture.
> @@ -356,17 +359,6 @@ static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog)
>
> BUG_ON(INT_MAX / fprog->len < sizeof(struct sock_filter));
>
> - /*
> - * Installing a seccomp filter requires that the task has
> - * CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its namespace or be running with no_new_privs.
> - * This avoids scenarios where unprivileged tasks can affect the
> - * behavior of privileged children.
> - */
> - if (!task_no_new_privs(current) &&
> - security_capable_noaudit(current_cred(), current_user_ns(),
> - CAP_SYS_ADMIN) != 0)
> - return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
> -
> /* Allocate a new seccomp_filter */
> sfilter = kzalloc(sizeof(*sfilter), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
> if (!sfilter)
> @@ -510,8 +502,105 @@ static void seccomp_send_sigsys(int syscall, int reason)
> info.si_syscall = syscall;
> force_sig_info(SIGSYS, &info, current);
> }
> +
> #endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
>
> +#if defined(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) && defined(CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER)
> +static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_ebpf(int fd)
> +{
> + struct seccomp_filter *ret;
> + struct bpf_prog *prog;
> +
> + prog = bpf_prog_get(fd);
> + if (IS_ERR(prog))
> + return (struct seccomp_filter *) prog;
> +
> + if (prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_SECCOMP) {
> + bpf_prog_put(prog);
> + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> + }
> +
> + ret = kzalloc(sizeof(*ret), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
> + if (!ret) {
> + bpf_prog_put(prog);
> + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> + }
> +
> + ret->prog = prog;
> + atomic_set(&ret->usage, 1);
> +
> + /* Intentionally don't bpf_prog_put() here, because the underlying prog
> + * is refcounted too and we're holding a reference from the struct
> + * seccomp_filter object.
> + */
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static long seccomp_ebpf_add_fd(struct seccomp_ebpf *ebpf)
> +{
> + struct seccomp_filter *prepared;
> +
> + prepared = seccomp_prepare_ebpf(ebpf->add_fd);
> + if (IS_ERR(prepared))
> + return PTR_ERR(prepared);
> +
> + return seccomp_install_filter(ebpf->add_flags, prepared);
> +}
> +
> +static long seccomp_mode_filter_ebpf(unsigned int cmd, const char __user *uargs)
> +{
> + const struct seccomp_ebpf __user *uebpf;
> + struct seccomp_ebpf ebpf;
> + unsigned int size;
> + long ret = -EFAULT;
> +
> + uebpf = (const struct seccomp_ebpf __user *) uargs;
> +
> + if (get_user(size, &uebpf->size) != 0)
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + /* If we're handed a bigger struct than we know of,
> + * ensure all the unknown bits are 0 - i.e. new
> + * user-space does not rely on any kernel feature
> + * extensions we dont know about yet.
> + */
> + if (size > sizeof(ebpf)) {
> + unsigned char __user *addr;
> + unsigned char __user *end;
> + unsigned char val;
> +
> + addr = (void __user *)uebpf + sizeof(ebpf);
> + end = (void __user *)uebpf + size;
> +
> + for (; addr < end; addr++) {
> + int err = get_user(val, addr);
> +
> + if (err)
> + return err;
> + if (val)
> + return -E2BIG;
> + }
> + size = sizeof(ebpf);
> + }
> +
> + if (copy_from_user(&ebpf, uebpf, size) != 0)
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + switch (cmd) {
> + case SECCOMP_EBPF_ADD_FD:
> + ret = seccomp_ebpf_add_fd(&ebpf);
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +#else
> +static long seccomp_mode_filter_ebpf(unsigned int cmd, const char __user *uargs)
> +{
> + return -EINVAL;
> +}
> +#endif
> +
> /*
> * Secure computing mode 1 allows only read/write/exit/sigreturn.
> * To be fully secure this must be combined with rlimit
> @@ -760,9 +849,7 @@ out:
> static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags,
> const char __user *filter)
> {
> - const unsigned long seccomp_mode = SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER;
> struct seccomp_filter *prepared = NULL;
> - long ret = -EINVAL;
>
> /* Validate flags. */
> if (flags & ~SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_MASK)
> @@ -773,6 +860,26 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags,
> if (IS_ERR(prepared))
> return PTR_ERR(prepared);
>
> + return seccomp_install_filter(flags, prepared);
> +}
> +
> +static long seccomp_install_filter(unsigned int flags,
> + struct seccomp_filter *prepared)
> +{
> + const unsigned long seccomp_mode = SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER;
> + long ret = -EINVAL;
> +
> + /*
> + * Installing a seccomp filter requires that the task has
> + * CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its namespace or be running with no_new_privs.
> + * This avoids scenarios where unprivileged tasks can affect the
> + * behavior of privileged children.
> + */
> + if (!task_no_new_privs(current) &&
> + security_capable_noaudit(current_cred(), current_user_ns(),
> + CAP_SYS_ADMIN) != 0)
> + return -EACCES;
> +
> /*
> * Make sure we cannot change seccomp or nnp state via TSYNC
> * while another thread is in the middle of calling exec.
> @@ -875,6 +982,8 @@ static long do_seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags,
> return seccomp_set_mode_strict();
> case SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER:
> return seccomp_set_mode_filter(flags, uargs);
> + case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER_EBPF:
> + return seccomp_mode_filter_ebpf(flags, uargs);
> default:
> return -EINVAL;
> }
> --
> 2.1.4
>
> --
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--
Michael Kerrisk
Linux man-pages maintainer; http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/
Linux/UNIX System Programming Training: http://man7.org/training/
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