linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] SUNRPC: Fix a race in xs_reset

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Message-ID: <20150915145229.4e69d5f7@synchrony.poochiereds.net>
Date:	Tue, 15 Sep 2015 14:52:29 -0400
From:	Jeff Layton <jlayton@...chiereds.net>
To:	"Suzuki K. Poulose" <suzuki.poulose@....com>
Cc:	Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@...marydata.com>,
	Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@...app.com>,
	"J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@...ldses.org>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, linux-nfs@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] SUNRPC: Fix a race in xs_reset_transport

On Tue, 15 Sep 2015 16:49:23 +0100
"Suzuki K. Poulose" <suzuki.poulose@....com> wrote:

> From: "Suzuki K. Poulose" <suzuki.poulose@....com>
> 
> Encountered the following BUG() with 4.3-rc1 on a fast model
> for arm64 with NFS root filesystem.
> 
> ------------[ cut here ]------------
> kernel BUG at fs/inode.c:1493!
> 
> Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
> Modules linked in:
> CPU: 2 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.3.0-rc1+ #855
> Hardware name: FVP Base (DT)
> task: ffffc000760b0000 ti: ffffc00076070000 task.ti: ffffc00076070000
> PC is at iput+0x144/0x170
> LR is at sock_release+0xbc/0xdc
> pc : [<ffffc000001b4920>] lr : [<ffffc000004d1974>] pstate: 40000045
> sp : ffffc00076073790
> x29: ffffc00076073790 x28: ffffc00076073b40
> x27: 00000000000003e8 x26: ffffc00076955000
> x25: 000000000000000c x24: ffffc00076637200
> x23: ffffc00076073930 x22: ffffc000769b8180
> x21: ffffc000740500a8 x20: ffffc00074050158
> x19: ffffc00074050030 x18: 000000009fcef6bf
> x17: 00000000593e3df5 x16: 00000000b597f71d
> x15: 00000000e2f9d3f6 x14: 0ffffffffffffffe
> x13: 0000000000000020 x12: 0101010101010101
> x11: 00000000000001c9 x10: 0000000000000750
> x9 : ffffc00076073670 x8 : ffffc000760b07b0
> x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 0000000000000001
> x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 00000000ffffffff
> x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffffffffffffffff
> x1 : ffffc00076070000 x0 : 0000000000000060
> 
> Process swapper/0 (pid: 1, stack limit = 0xffffc00076070020)
> Stack: (0xffffc00076073790 to 0xffffc00076074000)
> 
>  [ stack contents stripped ]
> 
> Call trace:
> [<ffffc000001b4920>] iput+0x144/0x170
> [<ffffc000004d1970>] sock_release+0xb8/0xdc
> [<ffffc00000578df0>] xs_reset_transport+0x8c/0xac
> [<ffffc00000578e60>] xs_close+0x50/0x6c
> [<ffffc00000578e9c>] xs_destroy+0x20/0x5c
> [<ffffc00000575f70>] xprt_destroy+0x68/0x8c
> [<ffffc0000057777c>] xprt_put+0x24/0x30
> [<ffffc000005726c4>] rpc_free_client+0x78/0xd8
> [<ffffc0000057288c>] rpc_release_client+0x94/0xec
> [<ffffc00000572aac>] rpc_shutdown_client+0x58/0x118
> [<ffffc00000278588>] nfs_mount+0x100/0x234
> [<ffffc0000026cc88>] nfs_request_mount+0xa8/0x12c
> [<ffffc0000026e564>] nfs_try_mount+0x54/0x2b4
> [<ffffc0000026f140>] nfs_fs_mount+0x5cc/0xac0
> [<ffffc0000019f1a0>] mount_fs+0x38/0x158
> [<ffffc000001b81a8>] vfs_kern_mount+0x48/0x11c
> [<ffffc000001bb390>] do_mount+0x208/0xc04
> [<ffffc000001bc0b0>] SyS_mount+0x78/0xd0
> [<ffffc000007f0fa8>] mount_root+0x80/0x148
> [<ffffc000007f11a8>] prepare_namespace+0x138/0x184
> [<ffffc000007f0b20>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1cc/0x1f4
> [<ffffc000005a2914>] kernel_init+0xc/0xd8
> Code: b5fffc00 17ffffed d4210000 17ffffd7 (d4210000)
> ---[ end trace 02951451f1831f54 ]---
> 
> With rpc_debug enabled here is the log :
> 
> RPC:       shutting down mount client for your.nfs.server
> RPC:       rpc_release_client(ffffc00076637800)
> RPC:       destroying UNIX authenticator ffffc000008f48c8
> RPC:       destroying mount client for your.nfs.server
> RPC:       destroying transport ffffc00076226000
> RPC:       xs_destroy xprt ffffc00076226000
> RPC:       xs_close xprt ffffc00076226000
> RPC:       xs_tcp_state_change client ffffc00076226000...
> RPC:       state 4 conn 1 dead 0 zapped 1 sk_shutdown 3
> RPC:       xs_tcp_state_change client ffffc00076226000...
> RPC:       state 5 conn 0 dead 0 zapped 1 sk_shutdown 3
> RPC:       xs_tcp_state_change client ffffc00076226000...
> RPC:       state 7 conn 0 dead 0 zapped 1 sk_shutdown 3
> RPC:       disconnected transport ffffc00076226000
> RPC:       xs_tcp_state_change client ffffc00076226000...
> RPC:       state 7 conn 0 dead 0 zapped 1 sk_shutdown 3
> RPC:       disconnected transport ffffc00076226000
> RPC:       xs_tcp_data_ready...
> RPC:       xs_tcp_state_change client ffffc00076226000...
> RPC:       state 7 conn 0 dead 0 zapped 1 sk_shutdown 3
> RPC:       disconnected transport ffffc00076226000
> RPC:       wake_up_first(ffffc00076226170 "xprt_sending")
> 
> So it looks like just before we lock the callbacks in xs_reset_transport,
> a few of the callbacks got through and issued the reset before we could
> lock it. And we end up repeating the cleanups, ending up in the above
> BUG() due to multiple sock_release().
> 
> This patch fixes the race by confirming that somebody else hasn't performed
> the reset while we were waiting for the lock. Also, the kernel_shutdown()
> is performed only if the sock is non-NULL to avoid a possible race.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@....com>
> ---
>  net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c |    9 ++++++++-
>  1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c b/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c
> index 7be90bc..6f4789d 100644
> --- a/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c
> +++ b/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c
> @@ -822,9 +822,16 @@ static void xs_reset_transport(struct sock_xprt *transport)
>  	if (atomic_read(&transport->xprt.swapper))
>  		sk_clear_memalloc(sk);
>  
> -	kernel_sock_shutdown(sock, SHUT_RDWR);
> +	if (sock)
> +		kernel_sock_shutdown(sock, SHUT_RDWR);
>  

Good catch, but...isn't this still racy? What prevents transport->sock
being set to NULL after you assign it to "sock" but before calling
kernel_sock_shutdown? You might end up calling that on a socket that
has already had sock_release called on it. I believe that would be a bad
thing.

What might be better is to move the assignment to sock inside the
spinlock and then call kernel socket shutdown after dropping the
spinlock. Something like:

    write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
    ...
    sock = transport->sock;
    transport->sock = NULL;
    ...
    write_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
    if (sock)
        kernel_sock_shutdown(sock, SHUT_RDWR);

I think that'd be safe...

>  	write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
> +	/* Check someone has already done the job, while we were waiting */
> +	if (!transport->inet) {
> +		write_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
> +		return;
> +	}
> +
>  	transport->inet = NULL;
>  	transport->sock = NULL;
>  


-- 
Jeff Layton <jlayton@...chiereds.net>
--
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