lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date:	Thu, 17 Sep 2015 18:08:37 +0200
From:	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
To:	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
Cc:	ebiederm@...ssion.com, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk,
	akpm@...ux-foundation.org, mingo@...nel.org,
	paulmck@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, mhocko@...e.cz,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, ktsan@...glegroups.com,
	kcc@...gle.com, andreyknvl@...gle.com, glider@...gle.com,
	hboehm@...gle.com, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] kernel: fix data race in put_pid

Honestly, I can not see how this can happen. So I do not really
understand the problem and the fix.

And if this can happen I can't understand how this patch can help.
What about "ns = pid->numbers[pid->level].ns" ? It can be reordered
with atomic_read_acquire().

I leave this to other reviewers, but perhaps you can spell the
"For example" part of the changelog.


On 09/17, Dmitry Vyukov wrote:
>
> put_pid checks whether the current thread has the only reference
> to the pid with atomic_read() which does not have any memory
> barriers, and if so proceeds directly to kmem_cache_free().
> As the result memory accesses to the object in kmem_cache_free()
> or user accesses to the object after reallocation (again without
> any memory barriers on fast path) can hoist above the atomic_read()
> check and conflict with memory accesses to the pid object in other
> threads before they released their references.
> 
> There is a control dependency between the atomic_read() check and
> kmem_cache_free(), but control dependencies are disregarded by some
> architectures. Documentation/memory-barriers.txt explicitly states:
> "A load-load control dependency requires a full read memory barrier.
> ... please note that READ_ONCE_CTRL() is not optional! [even for stores]"
> in the CONTROL DEPENDENCIES section.
> 
> For example, if store to the first word of the object to build a freelist
> in kmem_cache_free() hoists above the check, stores to the first word
> in other threads can corrupt the memory allocator freelist.
> 
> Use atomic_read_acquire() for the fast path check to hand off properly
> acquired object to memory allocator.
> 
> The data race was found with KernelThreadSanitizer (KTSAN).
> 
> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
> ---
>  kernel/pid.c | 2 +-
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/kernel/pid.c b/kernel/pid.c
> index ca36879..3b0b13d 100644
> --- a/kernel/pid.c
> +++ b/kernel/pid.c
> @@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ void put_pid(struct pid *pid)
>  		return;
>  
>  	ns = pid->numbers[pid->level].ns;
> -	if ((atomic_read(&pid->count) == 1) ||
> +	if ((atomic_read_acquire(&pid->count) == 1) ||
>  	     atomic_dec_and_test(&pid->count)) {
>  		kmem_cache_free(ns->pid_cachep, pid);
>  		put_pid_ns(ns);
> -- 
> 2.6.0.rc0.131.gf624c3d
> 

--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ