linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] kernel: fix data race in put

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Message-ID: <CACT4Y+bnqMGjMV6FHHJWsx0YaxWmRqAM+YY7b5wz-7JmFBnwjA@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Thu, 17 Sep 2015 19:57:15 +0200
From:	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
To:	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
Cc:	ebiederm@...ssion.com, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
	Paul McKenney <paulmck@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>, mhocko@...e.cz,
	LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, ktsan@...glegroups.com,
	Kostya Serebryany <kcc@...gle.com>,
	Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>,
	Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
	Hans Boehm <hboehm@...gle.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] kernel: fix data race in put_pid

I can update the patch description, but let me explain it here first.

Here is the essence of what happens:

// thread 1
1: pid->foo = 1; // foo is the first word of pid object
// then it does put_pid
2: atomic_dec_and_test(&pid->count) // decrements count to 1 and
returns false so the function returns

// thread 2
// executes put_pid
3: atomic_load(&pid->count); // returns 1, so proceed to kmem_cache_free
// then kmem_cache_free does:
5: head->freelist = (void*)pid;

This can be executed as:

4: *(void**)pid = head->freelist;
1: pid->foo = 1; // foo is the first word of pid object
2: atomic_dec_and_test(&pid->count) // decrements count to 1 and
returns false so the function returns
3: atomic_load(&pid->count); // returns 1, so proceed to kmem_cache_free
5: head->freelist = (void*)pid;


And we get corrupted allocator freelist.



On Thu, Sep 17, 2015 at 7:44 PM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com> wrote:
> On 09/17, Dmitry Vyukov wrote:
>>
>> What happens here exactly matches what is described in CONTROL
>> DEPENDENCIES section of Documentation/memory-barriers.txt. So all the
>> bad things described there are possible here.
>
> And I still can't understand how these bad things connect to put_pid().
> Probably I should re-read memory-barriers.txt, it changes quite often.
>
>> I don't
>> know what to add to that.
>
> OK, let me quote the parts of your changelog,
>
>         For example, if store to the first word of the object to build a freelist
>         in kmem_cache_free() hoists above the check, stores to the first word
>         in other threads can corrupt the memory allocator freelist.
>
> I simply can't parse this. Yes, this is probably because of my bad
> English, but I'll appreciate it if you can explain at least, say,
> "stores to the first word in other threads".
>
> Did you mean that a freed pid can be reallocated by another thread,
> then overwritten, and this all can happen before atomic_read(count)?
>
>
> Hmm. or perhaps you meant that the "last" put_pid() which observes
> atomic_read() == 1 can race with another thread which writes to this
> pid and does put_pid()? This is another story, and if you meant this
> the changelog could clearly explain your concerns.
>
> Or what?
>
>
> So let me repeat. Since I can't understand you, I leave this to other
> reviewers. But imho the changelog should be updated in any case.
>
> Oleg.
>



-- 
Dmitry Vyukov, Software Engineer, dvyukov@...gle.com
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