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Message-ID: <20150921084642.GA30984@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2015 10:46:42 +0200
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
xen-devel <Xen-devel@...ts.xen.org>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
KVM list <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@...nel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/msr: Carry on after a non-"safe" MSR access
fails without !panic_on_oops
* Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote:
> On Sep 20, 2015 5:15 PM, "Linus Torvalds" <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Sun, Sep 20, 2015 at 5:02 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org> wrote:
> > > This demotes an OOPS and likely panic due to a failed non-"safe" MSR
> > > access to a WARN_ON_ONCE and a return of zero (in the RDMSR case).
> > > We still write a pr_info entry unconditionally for debugging.
> >
> > No, this is wrong.
> >
> > If you really want to do something like this, then just make all MSR reads
> > safe. So the only difference between "safe" and "unsafe" is that the unsafe
> > version just doesn't check the return value, and silently just returns zero
> > for reads (or writes nothing).
> >
> > To quote Obi-Wan: "Use the exception table, Luke".
> >
> > Because decoding instructions is just too ugly. We'll do it for CPU errata
> > where we might have to do it for user space code too (ie the AMD prefetch
> > mess), but for code that _we_ control? Hell no.
> >
> > So NAK on this.
>
> My personal preference is to just not do this at all. A couple people disagree.
> If we make the unsafe variants not oops, then I think we want to have the nice
> loud warning, since these issues are bugs if they happen.
>
> We could certainly use the exception table for this, but it'll result in bigger
> core, since each MSR access will need an exception table entry and an associated
> fixup to call some helper that warns and sets the result to zero.
>
> I'd be happy to implement that, but only if it'll be applied. Otherwise I'd
> rather just drop this patch and keep the rest of the series.
Linus, what's your preference?
Due to the bug mentioned earlier in this thread all MSR reads are currently 'safe'
on all the major Linux distros (which all have CONFIG_PARAVIRT=y), i.e. by
'fixing' them we'd reintroduce random crashes into various fragile pieces of
code...
To add insult to injury, the current 'silently safe by accident' MSR code isn't so
safe: because it leaves the result of the read uninitialized...
To fix this all I'd really like to have:
- safe MSR reads by default (i.e. never boot crash the kernel on some rare
condition - which to most users is either a silent boot hang or an instant
restart). Historicaly we had a stream of 'silly boot crashes' due to MSR reads
that generate a #GPF. They make Linux less usable around the edges, especially
in the x86 non-server (desktop) space where most hardware vendors are either
openly Linux hostile, or, at best, Linux oblivious.
- proper result-zeroing behavior on exceptions
- and we should also generate _some_ sort of warning when MSR exceptions happen
in an 'unintended' fashion.
Maybe the warning could be put under a (default-enabled) config option for the
size conscious.
Or we could extend exception table entry encoding to include a 'warning bit', to
not bloat the kernel. If the exception handler code encounters such an exception
it would generate a one-time warning for that entry, but otherwise not crash the
kernel and continue execution with an all-zeroes result for the MSR read.
Thanks,
Ingo
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