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Message-ID: <CAPAsAGwCgCbR78QDBLH2w=njTXygYzYZs4LJvKgr+OLbUFf1mA@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Sat, 3 Oct 2015 14:31:13 +0300
From:	Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@...il.com>
To:	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc:	Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@...cle.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
	Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>,
	Kostya Serebryany <kcc@...gle.com>,
	Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
	kasan-dev <kasan-dev@...glegroups.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
	Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@...hat.com>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
	"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
	Wolfram Gloger <wmglo@...t.med.uni-muenchen.de>
Subject: Re: [patch 1/2] x86/process: Add proper bound checks in 64bit get_wchan()

2015-10-03 13:54 GMT+03:00 Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>:
> On Fri, 2 Oct 2015, Sasha Levin wrote:
>> I'm seeing a different issue with this patch:
>>
>> [ 5228.736320] BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in get_wchan+0xf9/0x1b0 at addr ffff88049d2b7c50
>> [ 5228.737560] Read of size 8 by task killall/22177
>> [ 5228.738304] page:ffffea001274adc0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:          (null) index:0x0
>> [ 5228.739374] flags: 0x6fffff80000000()
>> [ 5228.739862] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
>> [ 5228.741764] CPU: 8 PID: 22177 Comm: killall Not tainted 4.3.0-rc3-next-20151002-sasha-00076-gde7fa56-dirty #2590
>> [ 5228.743337]  ffff882c80967828 000000007a901a83 ffff882c80967790 ffffffffacd2c8c8
>> [ 5228.744409]  ffff88049d2b7c50 ffff882c80967818 ffffffffab74befb ffff882c8bd00000
>> [ 5228.745436]  0000000000000002 0000000000000282 ffff882c8bd00cf8 0000000000000001
>> [ 5228.746446] Call Trace:
>> [ 5228.746881] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:52)
>> [ 5228.747720] kasan_report_error (include/linux/kasan.h:28 mm/kasan/report.c:170 mm/kasan/report.c:237)
>> [ 5228.748670] __asan_report_load8_noabort (mm/kasan/report.c:279)
>> [ 5228.750563] get_wchan (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:561)
>> [ 5228.751378] do_task_stat (fs/proc/array.c:458)
>> [ 5228.755912] proc_tgid_stat (fs/proc/array.c:565)
>> [ 5228.756770] proc_single_show (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:118 include/linux/sched.h:2012 fs/proc/base.c:789)
>> [ 5228.759066] seq_read (fs/seq_file.c:238)
>> [ 5228.762360] __vfs_read (fs/read_write.c:432)
>> [ 5228.767957] vfs_read (fs/read_write.c:454)
>> [ 5228.769368] SyS_read (fs/read_write.c:570 fs/read_write.c:562)
>> [ 5228.778344] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:186)
>> [ 5228.779272] Memory state around the buggy address:
>> [ 5228.779971]  ffff88049d2b7b00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>> [ 5228.780992]  ffff88049d2b7b80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>> [ 5228.782021] >ffff88049d2b7c00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>> [ 5228.783066]                                                     ^
>> [ 5228.783936]  ffff88049d2b7c80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>> [ 5228.784994]  ffff88049d2b7d00: 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 f4 f4 f4 f3 f3 f3
>>
>>         fp = READ_ONCE(*(unsigned long *)sp);
>>         do {
>>                 if (fp < bottom || fp > top)
>>                         return 0;
>>                 ip = READ_ONCE(*(unsigned long *)(fp + sizeof(unsigned long)));
>>                 if (!in_sched_functions(ip))
>>                         return ip;
>>                 fp = READ_ONCE(*(unsigned long *)fp); <=== Here
>
> Weird, we accessed
>
>      *(unsigned long *)(fp + sizeof(unsigned long))
>
> a few lines above, i.e. ffff88049d2b7c58
>
> But what's more weird is that the memory dump does not really look
> like a stack at all.
>
> ffff88049d2b7c50 is stored on the stack:
>
>> [ 5228.744409]  ffff88049d2b7c50 ffff882c80967818 ffffffffab74befb ffff882c8bd00000
>
> But if it is not inside the stack bounds, how do we end up
> dereferencing it. Confused....
>

I'm sure that we in stack bounds here.
But we are not inside bounds of some stack variable
and KASAN doesn't like it.

KASAN changes stack frame of each function, e.g.
    void foo() {
            int a;
    }

transformed to:
    void foo() {
            char redzone1[32];
            int a;
            char redzone2[28];
            char redzone3[32];
    }

So any access to redzones will be reported.

I could make a patch which will tell KASAN to ignore get_wchan(),
but if there are any real bugs left in get_wchan() they will be ignored too.
--
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