linux-kernel - Re: [patch 1/2] x86/process: Add proper bound checks in 64bit get

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Date:	Fri, 2 Oct 2015 18:31:04 -0700
From:	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To:	Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@...cle.com>
Cc:	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@...il.com>,
	Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>,
	Kostya Serebryany <kcc@...gle.com>,
	Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
	kasan-dev <kasan-dev@...glegroups.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
	Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@...hat.com>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
	Wolfram Gloger <wmglo@...t.med.uni-muenchen.de>
Subject: Re: [patch 1/2] x86/process: Add proper bound checks in 64bit get_wchan()

On Fri, Oct 2, 2015 at 6:15 PM, Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@...cle.com> wrote:
> On 09/30/2015 04:38 AM, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
>> Dmitry Vyukov reported the following using trinity and the memory
>> error detector AddressSanitizer
>> (https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel).
>>
>> [ 124.575597] ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on
>> address ffff88002e280000
>> [ 124.576801] ffff88002e280000 is located 131938492886538 bytes to
>> the left of 28857600-byte region [ffffffff81282e0a, ffffffff82e0830a)
>> [ 124.578633] Accessed by thread T10915:
>> [ 124.579295] inlined in describe_heap_address
>> ./arch/x86/mm/asan/report.c:164
>> [ 124.579295] #0 ffffffff810dd277 in asan_report_error
>> ./arch/x86/mm/asan/report.c:278
>> [ 124.580137] #1 ffffffff810dc6a0 in asan_check_region
>> ./arch/x86/mm/asan/asan.c:37
>> [ 124.581050] #2 ffffffff810dd423 in __tsan_read8 ??:0
>> [ 124.581893] #3 ffffffff8107c093 in get_wchan
>> ./arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c:444
>>
>> The address checks in the 64bit implementation of get_wchan() are
>> wrong in several ways:
>>
>>  - The lower bound of the stack is not the start of the stack
>>    page. It's the start of the stack page plus sizeof (struct
>>    thread_info)
>>
>>  - The upper bound must be:
>>
>>        top_of_stack - TOP_OF_KERNEL_STACK_PADDING - 2 * sizeof(unsigned long).
>>
>>    The 2 * sizeof(unsigned long) is required because the stack pointer
>>    points at the frame pointer. The layout on the stack is: ... IP FP
>>    ... IP FP. So we need to make sure that both IP and FP are in the
>>    bounds.
>>
>> Fix the bound checks and get rid of the mix of numeric constants, u64
>> and unsigned long. Making all unsigned long allows us to use the same
>> function for 32bit as well.
>>
>> Use READ_ONCE() when accessing the stack. This does not prevent a
>> concurrent wakeup of the task and the stack changing, but at least it
>> avoids TOCTOU.
>>
>> Also check task state at the end of the loop. Again that does not
>> prevent concurrent changes, but it avoids walking for nothing.
>>
>> Add proper comments while at it.
>>
>> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
>> Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@...cle.com>
>> Based-on-patch-from: Wolfram Gloger <wmglo@...t.med.uni-muenchen.de>
>> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
>
> I'm seeing a different issue with this patch:
>
> [ 5228.736320] BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in get_wchan+0xf9/0x1b0 at addr ffff88049d2b7c50

This could be a real bug, but it also could plausibly be kasan not
understanding that this code can legitimately read random addresses
within the stack page.  In particular, it can read up into the entry
asm stack, which kasan might consider off-limits.  (kasan may also
consider the return address itself off limits.)

--Andy
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