linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 net-next 1/3] bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs

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Date:	Fri, 9 Oct 2015 11:28:22 +0200
From:	Thomas Graf <tgraf@...g.ch>
To:	Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@...essinduktion.org>
Cc:	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...mgrid.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
	netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 net-next 1/3] bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs

On 10/08/15 at 08:20pm, Hannes Frederic Sowa wrote:
> Hi Alexei,
> 
> On Thu, Oct 8, 2015, at 07:23, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> > The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled.
> > This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1).  Once true,
> > bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process,
> > and the toggle cannot be set back to false.
> 
> This approach seems fine to me.
> 
> I am wondering if it makes sense to somehow allow ebpf access per
> namespace? I currently have no idea how that could work and on which
> namespace type to depend or going with a prctl or even cgroup maybe. The
> rationale behind this is, that maybe some namespaces like openstack
> router namespaces could make usage of advanced ebpf capabilities in the
> kernel, while other namespaces, especially where untrusted third parties
> are hosted, shouldn't have access to those facilities.
> 
> In that way, hosters would be able to e.g. deploy more efficient
> performance monitoring container (which should still need not to run as
> root) while the majority of the users has no access to that. Or think
> about routing instances in some namespaces, etc. etc.

The standard way of granting privileges like this for containers is
through CAP_ which does seem like a good fit for this as well and would
also solve your mentioned openstack use case.
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