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Message-ID: <561E7027.3070106@list.ru>
Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2015 18:09:27 +0300
From: Stas Sergeev <stsp@...t.ru>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>,
Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@...hat.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...allels.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC 3/4] x86/signal/64: Re-add support for SS in the 64-bit
signal context
14.10.2015 18:01, Ingo Molnar пишет:
>
> * Stas Sergeev <stsp@...t.ru> wrote:
>
>> On an off-topic: there was recently a patch from you that
>> disables vm86() by mmap_min_addr. I've found that dosemu, when
>> started as root, could override mmap_min_addr. I guess this will
>> no longer work, right? Not a big regression, just something to
>> know and document.
>
> So I think it should still work, because we check for mmap_min_addr in the system
> call itself:
>
> static long do_sys_vm86(struct vm86plus_struct __user *user_vm86, bool plus)
> {
> ...
> err = security_mmap_addr(0);
> if (err) {
> /*
>
> So if dosemu first tweaks mmap_min_addr, the syscall should succeed.
No, it doesn't tweak it.
It just seems that root is allowed to do mmap(0, MAP_FIXED)
_regardless_ of mmap_min_addr. But it would be crazy to run vm86() as
root to also bypass the check (dosemu drops privs earlier), so I guess
this trick will stop working.
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