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Message-ID: <CAFLxGvzJONWTbpD8GFfDWDQiPxONrFaRAuXonXXUWaR1pcTUgw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 17 Oct 2015 22:17:36 +0200
From: Richard Weinberger <richard.weinberger@...il.com>
To: Tobias Markus <tobias@...lix.eu>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...uxfoundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
"Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
LSM <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
"open list:ABI/API" <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-man <linux-man@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] userns/capability: Add user namespace capability
On Sat, Oct 17, 2015 at 5:58 PM, Tobias Markus <tobias@...lix.eu> wrote:
> One question remains though: Does this break userspace executables that
> expect being able to create user namespaces without priviledge? Since
> creating user namespaces without CAP_SYS_ADMIN was not possible before
> Linux 3.8, programs should already expect a potential EPERM upon calling
> clone. Since creating a user namespace without CAP_SYS_USER_NS would
> also cause EPERM, we should be on the safe side.
In case of doubt, yes it will break existing software.
Hiding user namespaces behind CAP_SYS_USER_NS will not magically
make them secure.
--
Thanks,
//richard
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