linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.2 012/258] Revert "KVM: x86: apply guest MTRR virtualization on host reserved pages"

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Date:	Sat, 17 Oct 2015 18:55:25 -0700
From:	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
	stable@...r.kernel.org, harn-solo@....de,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.2 012/258] Revert "KVM: x86: apply guest MTRR virtualization on host reserved pages"

4.2-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>

commit 606decd67049217684e3cb5a54104d51ddd4ef35 upstream.

This reverts commit fd717f11015f673487ffc826e59b2bad69d20fe5.
It was reported to cause Machine Check Exceptions (bug 104091).

Reported-by: harn-solo@....de
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c |    7 +++++--
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c |   11 ++++++++---
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -1166,11 +1166,14 @@ static u64 svm_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vc
 	u8 mtrr;
 
 	/*
-	 * 1. MMIO: trust guest MTRR, so same as item 3.
+	 * 1. MMIO: always map as UC
 	 * 2. No passthrough: always map as WB, and force guest PAT to WB as well
 	 * 3. Passthrough: can't guarantee the result, try to trust guest.
 	 */
-	if (!is_mmio && !kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(vcpu->kvm))
+	if (is_mmio)
+		return _PAGE_NOCACHE;
+
+	if (!kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(vcpu->kvm))
 		return 0;
 
 	mtrr = kvm_mtrr_get_guest_memory_type(vcpu, gfn);
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -8634,17 +8634,22 @@ static u64 vmx_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vc
 	u64 ipat = 0;
 
 	/* For VT-d and EPT combination
-	 * 1. MMIO: guest may want to apply WC, trust it.
+	 * 1. MMIO: always map as UC
 	 * 2. EPT with VT-d:
 	 *   a. VT-d without snooping control feature: can't guarantee the
-	 *	result, try to trust guest.  So the same as item 1.
+	 *	result, try to trust guest.
 	 *   b. VT-d with snooping control feature: snooping control feature of
 	 *	VT-d engine can guarantee the cache correctness. Just set it
 	 *	to WB to keep consistent with host. So the same as item 3.
 	 * 3. EPT without VT-d: always map as WB and set IPAT=1 to keep
 	 *    consistent with host MTRR
 	 */
-	if (!is_mmio && !kvm_arch_has_noncoherent_dma(vcpu->kvm)) {
+	if (is_mmio) {
+		cache = MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE;
+		goto exit;
+	}
+
+	if (!kvm_arch_has_noncoherent_dma(vcpu->kvm)) {
 		ipat = VMX_EPT_IPAT_BIT;
 		cache = MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK;
 		goto exit;


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