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Message-Id: <a787bf402ceaeea8ee6589cebdbfee01c8367896.1445539084.git.dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Date:	Thu, 22 Oct 2015 21:49:30 +0300
From:	Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>
To:	zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, linux-ima-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Cc:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...wei.com>
Subject: [PATCHv3 6/6] evm: reset EVM status when file attributes changes

EVM verification status is cached in iint->evm_status
and if it was successful, never re-verified again when
IMA passes 'iint' to evm_verifyxattr().

When file attribute or extended attributes changes we may
wish to re-verify EVM integrity as well. For example,
after setting digital signature we may need to re-verify
the signature and update iint->flags that there is EVM
signature.

This patch enables that by resetting evm_status to
INTEGRITY_UKNOWN state.

Changes in v2:
* Flag setting moved to EVM layer

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...wei.com>
---
 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 420d94d..f716025 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -358,6 +358,15 @@ int evm_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
 	return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
 }
 
+static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+
+	iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+	if (iint)
+		iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
 /**
  * evm_inode_post_setxattr - update 'security.evm' to reflect the changes
  * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
@@ -378,6 +387,8 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 				 && !posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name)))
 		return;
 
+	evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode);
+
 	evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len);
 }
 
@@ -396,6 +407,8 @@ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
 	if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name))
 		return;
 
+	evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode);
+
 	evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
 }
 
-- 
2.1.4

--
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