linux-kernel - [PATCHv3 3/6] evm: enable EVM when X509 certificate is loaded

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Date:	Thu, 22 Oct 2015 21:49:27 +0300
From:	Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>
To:	zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, linux-ima-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Cc:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...wei.com>
Subject: [PATCHv3 3/6] evm: enable EVM when X509 certificate is loaded

In order to enable EVM before starting 'init' process,
evm_initialized needs to be non-zero. Before it was
indicating that HMAC key is loaded. When EVM loads
X509 before calling 'init', it is possible to enable
EVM to start signature based verification.

This patch defines bits to enable EVM if key of any type
is loaded.

Changes in v2:
* EVM_STATE_KEY_SET replaced by EVM_INIT_HMAC
* EVM_STATE_X509_SET replaced by EVM_INIT_X509

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...wei.com>
---
 security/integrity/evm/evm.h        | 3 +++
 security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 2 ++
 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c   | 6 +++++-
 security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c  | 4 ++--
 4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
index 88bfe77..f5f1272 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@
 
 #include "../integrity.h"
 
+#define EVM_INIT_HMAC	0x0001
+#define EVM_INIT_X509	0x0002
+
 extern int evm_initialized;
 extern char *evm_hmac;
 extern char *evm_hash;
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index 159ef3e..34e1a6f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type)
 	struct shash_desc *desc;
 
 	if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
+		if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC))
+			return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
 		tfm = &hmac_tfm;
 		algo = evm_hmac;
 	} else {
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 519de0a..420d94d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -475,7 +475,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_inode_init_security);
 #ifdef CONFIG_EVM_LOAD_X509
 void __init evm_load_x509(void)
 {
-	integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM, CONFIG_EVM_X509_PATH);
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM, CONFIG_EVM_X509_PATH);
+	if (!rc)
+		evm_initialized |= EVM_INIT_X509;
 }
 #endif
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
index cf12a04..3f775df 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	char temp[80];
 	int i, error;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || evm_initialized)
+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || (evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 
 	error = evm_init_key();
 	if (!error) {
-		evm_initialized = 1;
+		evm_initialized |= EVM_INIT_HMAC;
 		pr_info("initialized\n");
 	} else
 		pr_err("initialization failed\n");
-- 
2.1.4

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