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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jKj22-obrjhULdYx5+rEzNESHxLh6VZAbWugKr_LzA7kg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 26 Oct 2015 16:07:01 +0900
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@...onical.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...allels.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8] seccomp, ptrace: add support for dumping seccomp filters
On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 3:46 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 12:39 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com> wrote:
>> On 10/21, Tycho Andersen wrote:
>>>
>>> > And this leads to another question... If we expect that this interface
>>> > can change later, then perhaps PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_FILTER should also
>>> > dump some header before copy_to_user(fprog->filter) ? Say, just
>>> > "unsigned long version" == 0 for now. So that we can avoid
>>> > PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_FILTER_V2 in future.
>>>
>>> So this is interesting. Like Kees mentioned, the bulk of the work
>>> would be done by the bpf syscall. We'd still need some way to get
>>> access to the fd itself, which we could (ab)use
>>> PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_FILTER for, by returning the fd + BPF_MAXINSNS (so
>>> that it doesn't conflict with length) or something like that. Or add a
>>> _V2 as you say. If there is some change we can make to have a nicer
>>> interface than fd + BPF_MAXINSNS to future proof, I'm fine with making
>>> it.
>>
>> Can't comment, this is up to you/Kees ;)
>>
>> So, just in case, let me repeat I am fine with this patch.
>
> Cool, thanks. I'll get this into my tree after kernel summit. Thanks
> for suffering through all this Tycho!
Actually, since this depends on changes in net, could this get pulled
in from that direction?
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
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