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Message-Id: <1446306824-25175-1-git-send-email-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Date: Sat, 31 Oct 2015 17:53:44 +0200
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
To: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@....de>,
Marcel Selhorst <tpmdd@...horst.net>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Cc: tpmdd-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
chris.j.arges@...onical.com, seth.forshee@...onical.com,
colin.king@...onical.com, josh@...htriplett.org,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>,
Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@...idianresearch.com>,
David Safford <safford@...ibm.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
Subject: [PATCH RFC] tpm: seal with a policy
Support for sealing with a policy.
Two new options for trusted keys:
* 'policydigest=': provide a policydigest for the seal operation.
* 'policyhandle=': provide handle for a policy session for unsealing.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
---
drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig | 1 +
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++---
include/keys/trusted-type.h | 3 +++
security/keys/trusted.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--
4 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
index 3b84a8b..bd86261 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ menuconfig TCG_TPM
tristate "TPM Hardware Support"
depends on HAS_IOMEM
select SECURITYFS
+ select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
---help---
If you have a TPM security chip in your system, which
implements the Trusted Computing Group's specification,
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
index b08a0b4..6f567c3 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -463,6 +463,9 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if (options->policydigest_len > hash_digest_size[options->hash])
+ return -EINVAL;
+
rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -488,8 +491,17 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM2_ALG_KEYEDHASH);
tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, hash);
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_ATTR_USER_WITH_AUTH);
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); /* policy digest size */
+
+ if (options->policydigest_len) {
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->policydigest_len);
+ tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->policydigest,
+ options->policydigest_len);
+ } else {
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_ATTR_USER_WITH_AUTH);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
+ }
+
tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM2_ALG_NULL);
tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
@@ -617,7 +629,9 @@ static int tpm2_unseal(struct tpm_chip *chip,
return rc;
tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, blob_handle);
- tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, TPM2_RS_PW,
+ tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf,
+ options->policyhandle ?
+ options->policyhandle : TPM2_RS_PW,
NULL /* nonce */, 0,
0 /* session_attributes */,
options->blobauth /* hmac */,
diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
index a6a1008..e4beeca 100644
--- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h
+++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@ struct trusted_key_options {
unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE];
int pcrlock;
uint32_t hash;
+ uint32_t policydigest_len;
+ unsigned char *policydigest;
+ uint32_t policyhandle;
};
extern struct key_type key_type_trusted;
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
index 7a87bcd..ea043ff 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
@@ -713,6 +713,8 @@ enum {
Opt_keyhandle, Opt_keyauth, Opt_blobauth,
Opt_pcrinfo, Opt_pcrlock, Opt_migratable,
Opt_hash,
+ Opt_policydigest,
+ Opt_policyhandle,
};
static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
@@ -726,6 +728,8 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
{Opt_pcrlock, "pcrlock=%s"},
{Opt_migratable, "migratable=%s"},
{Opt_hash, "hash=%s"},
+ {Opt_policydigest, "policydigest=%s"},
+ {Opt_policyhandle, "policyhandle=%s"},
{Opt_err, NULL}
};
@@ -804,6 +808,17 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
if (i == HASH_ALGO__LAST ||
(!res && i != HASH_ALGO_SHA1))
return -EINVAL;
+ case Opt_policydigest:
+ opt->policydigest_len = strlen(args[0].from);
+ opt->policydigest = kstrdup(args[0].from, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!opt->policydigest)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ break;
+ case Opt_policyhandle:
+ res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle);
+ if (res < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ opt->policyhandle = handle;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
@@ -897,6 +912,13 @@ static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
return options;
}
+static void trusted_options_free(struct trusted_key_options *options)
+{
+ if (options->policydigest)
+ kfree(options->policydigest);
+ kfree(options);
+}
+
static struct trusted_key_payload *trusted_payload_alloc(struct key *key)
{
struct trusted_key_payload *p = NULL;
@@ -1003,7 +1025,7 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
out:
kfree(datablob);
- kfree(options);
+ trusted_options_free(options);
if (!ret)
rcu_assign_keypointer(key, payload);
else
@@ -1091,7 +1113,7 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free);
out:
kfree(datablob);
- kfree(new_o);
+ trusted_options_free(new_o);
return ret;
}
--
2.5.0
--
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