linux-kernel - Re: [KERNEL] Re: [KERNEL] Re: [KERNEL] Re: Kernel 4.3 breaks security in systems using capabilities

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Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.20.1511100924280.8420@east.gentwo.org>
Date:	Tue, 10 Nov 2015 09:25:41 -0600 (CST)
From:	Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>
To:	Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
cc:	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Richard Weinberger <richard.weinberger@...il.com>,
	Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@...il.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [KERNEL] Re: [KERNEL] Re: [KERNEL] Re: Kernel 4.3 breaks security
 in systems  using capabilities

On Tue, 10 Nov 2015, Theodore Ts'o wrote:

> If you want to create a patch, my recommendation would be to do one
> that turns off ambient capabilities as a CONFIG option, and hide it
> under CONFIG_EXPERT.  Or maybe adding a new securebit which disables
> ambient capabilities.  Whether or not that will be acceptable
> upstream, I don't know, mainly because I think a strong case can be

That is already available and was submitted with the patch.

commit 746bf6d64275be0c65b0631d8a72b16f1454cfa1
Author: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Date:   Fri Sep 4 15:42:51 2015 -0700

    capabilities: add a securebit to disable PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE

    Per Andrew Morgan's request, add a securebit to allow admins to disable
    PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE.  This securebit will prevent processes from adding
    capabilities to their ambient set.

    For simplicity, this disables PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE entirely rather than
    just disabling setting previously cleared bits.

    Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
    Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@...nel.org>
    Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>
    Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
    Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>
    Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>
    Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>
    Cc: Aaron Jones <aaronmdjones@...il.com>
    Cc: Ted Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
    Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@...nel.org>
    Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
    Cc: Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@...il.com>
    Cc: Markku Savela <msa@...h.iki.fi>
    Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
    Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>
    Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>

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