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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJ_Q4LLoaw=MHBDQVH0QuOFDvzwK5hhVN94n4AHWhARZQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 12:45:02 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
Cc: Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@....linux.org.uk>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
linux-nvdimm <linux-nvdimm@...1.01.org>,
Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@...ibm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@...nel.crashing.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@...ibm.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
"linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] restrict /dev/mem to idle io memory ranges
On Fri, Nov 20, 2015 at 12:26 PM, Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com> wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 20, 2015 at 12:12 PM, Russell King - ARM Linux
> <linux@....linux.org.uk> wrote:
>> On Fri, Nov 20, 2015 at 09:31:33AM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
>>> This effectively promotes IORESOURCE_BUSY to IORESOURCE_EXCLUSIVE
>>> semantics by default. If userspace really believes it is safe to access
>>> the memory region it can also perform the extra step of disabling an
>>> active driver. This protects device address ranges with read side
>>> effects and otherwise directs userspace to use the driver.
>>
>> I'm happy with this as long as we retain the option to disable this
>> new behaviour.
>>
>> The reason being, when developing a driver, it is _very_ useful to
>> be able to poke around in the device's (and system memory) address
>> spaces with tools like devmem2 to work out what's going on when
>> things go wrong.
>>
>> To put it another way, I think it's a good idea to disable access to
>> these regions on production systems, but for driver development, we
>> want to retain the ability to poke around in physical address space
>> in any way we so desire.
>>
>
> Sounds ok to me, but I do think it's a good idea to default it to the
> same value as STRICT_DEVMEM. Perhaps:
>
> bool "Filter I/O access to /dev/mem" if EXPERT
> default STRICT_DEVMEM
>
> When this in do we even need IORESOURCE_EXCLUSIVE? It's barely used.
Let's leave it for now to give us the debugging granularity Russell
mentioned. If it turns out it's never used, we can drop it in the
future.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
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