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Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+Wj_=27gsYStV5OuwNSznux7MtDcMuYe5wM2ORrna_TQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 30 Nov 2015 16:03:19 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...roid.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@....linux.org.uk>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
"linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Don Zickus <dzickus@...hat.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@....de>, jpoimboe@...hat.com,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
n-horiguchi@...jp.nec.com, Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
Mel Gorman <mgorman@...e.de>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
"linux-doc@...r.kernel.org" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@...roid.com>,
Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@...gle.com>,
Nick Kralevich <nnk@...gle.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>, Hector Marco <hecmargi@....es>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 4/4] x86: mm: support ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS.
On Thu, Nov 26, 2015 at 2:59 PM, Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...roid.com> wrote:
> x86: arch_mmap_rnd() uses hard-coded values, 8 for 32-bit and 28 for
> 64-bit, to generate the random offset for the mmap base address.
> This value represents a compromise between increased ASLR
> effectiveness and avoiding address-space fragmentation. Replace it
> with a Kconfig option, which is sensibly bounded, so that platform
> developers may choose where to place this compromise. Keep default
> values as new minimums.
>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...roid.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/mm/mmap.c | 12 ++++++------
> 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> index db3622f..12768c4 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> @@ -82,6 +82,8 @@ config X86
> select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN if X86_64 && SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP
> select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB
> select HAVE_ARCH_KMEMCHECK
> + select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
> + select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if COMPAT
> select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
> select HAVE_ARCH_SOFT_DIRTY if X86_64
> select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
> @@ -183,6 +185,20 @@ config HAVE_LATENCYTOP_SUPPORT
> config MMU
> def_bool y
>
> +config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN
> + default 28 if 64BIT
> + default 8
> +
> +config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX
> + default 32 if 64BIT
> + default 16
> +
> +config ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN
> + default 8
> +
> +config ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX
> + default 16
> +
> config SBUS
> bool
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
> index 844b06d..647fecf 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
> @@ -69,14 +69,14 @@ unsigned long arch_mmap_rnd(void)
> {
> unsigned long rnd;
>
> - /*
> - * 8 bits of randomness in 32bit mmaps, 20 address space bits
> - * 28 bits of randomness in 64bit mmaps, 40 address space bits
> - */
> if (mmap_is_ia32())
> - rnd = (unsigned long)get_random_int() % (1<<8);
> +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
> + rnd = (unsigned long)get_random_int() % (1 << mmap_rnd_compat_bits);
> +#else
> + rnd = (unsigned long)get_random_int() % (1 << mmap_rnd_bits);
> +#endif
> else
> - rnd = (unsigned long)get_random_int() % (1<<28);
> + rnd = (unsigned long)get_random_int() % (1 << mmap_rnd_bits);
>
> return rnd << PAGE_SHIFT;
> }
> --
> 2.6.0.rc2.230.g3dd15c0
>
Can you rework this logic to look more like the arm64 one? I think
it's more readable as:
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (mmap_is_ia32())
rnd = (unsigned long)get_random_int() % (1 << mmap_rnd_compat_bits);
else
#endif
rnd = (unsigned long)get_random_int() % (1 << mmap_rnd_bits);
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
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