Message-Id: <1449075615-20754-43-git-send-email-kamal@canonical.com>
Date:	Wed,  2 Dec 2015 08:58:13 -0800
From:	Kamal Mostafa <kamal@...onical.com>
To:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org,
	kernel-team@...ts.ubuntu.com
Cc:	Filipe Manana <fdmanana@...e.com>,
	Kamal Mostafa <kamal@...onical.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 042/164] Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents

3.19.8-ckt11 -stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@...e.com>

commit 0305cd5f7fca85dae392b9ba85b116896eb7c1c7 upstream.

When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.

Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:

   1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
      extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
      any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
      else);

   2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;

   3) User A makes the file world readable;

   4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;

   5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
      file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);

   6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
      its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
      the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
      that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
      user A that was never supposed to be public.

Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.

This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").

So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.

The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).

  seq=`basename $0`
  seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
  echo "QA output created by $seq"
  tmp=/tmp/$$
  status=1	# failure is the default!
  trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15

  _cleanup()
  {
      rm -f $tmp.*
  }

  # get standard environment, filters and checks
  . ./common/rc
  . ./common/filter

  # real QA test starts here
  _need_to_be_root
  _supported_fs btrfs
  _supported_os Linux
  _require_scratch
  _require_cloner

  rm -f $seqres.full

  _scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
  _scratch_mount "-o compress"

  # Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
  # and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
  # while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
  # 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
  # extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
  $XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128"   \
          -c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
          $SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
  $XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io

  # Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
  # on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
  sync

  # Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
  # compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
  # new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
  # bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
  $XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo

  # Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
  # This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
  # file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
  # the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
  # clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
  # than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
  # inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
  # file into the destination file.
  #
  # Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
  # inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
  # source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
  # inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
  # extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
  # file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
  # inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
  # done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
  # (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
  # it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
  # where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
  # space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
  $CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar

  # Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
  # extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
  # inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
  # which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
  # truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
  # stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
  # filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
  # size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
  # [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.

  # We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
  # not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
  # long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
  #
  # Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
  # leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
  # [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
  # file gave us the following content:
  #
  # 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
  # *
  # 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
  # *
  # 0000400
  echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
  od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar

  # Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
  # operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
  # test completes, failed reporting the following error:
  #
  #  root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong

  status=0
  exit

Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@...e.com>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@...onical.com>
---
 fs/btrfs/inode.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 68 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/btrfs/inode.c b/fs/btrfs/inode.c
index fbcd590..76a450c 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/inode.c
@@ -4074,6 +4074,47 @@ out:
 	return err;
 }
 
+static int truncate_inline_extent(struct inode *inode,
+				  struct btrfs_path *path,
+				  struct btrfs_key *found_key,
+				  const u64 item_end,
+				  const u64 new_size)
+{
+	struct extent_buffer *leaf = path->nodes[0];
+	int slot = path->slots[0];
+	struct btrfs_file_extent_item *fi;
+	u32 size = (u32)(new_size - found_key->offset);
+	struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(inode)->root;
+
+	fi = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, slot, struct btrfs_file_extent_item);
+
+	if (btrfs_file_extent_compression(leaf, fi) != BTRFS_COMPRESS_NONE) {
+		loff_t offset = new_size;
+		loff_t page_end = ALIGN(offset, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE);
+
+		/*
+		 * Zero out the remaining of the last page of our inline extent,
+		 * instead of directly truncating our inline extent here - that
+		 * would be much more complex (decompressing all the data, then
+		 * compressing the truncated data, which might be bigger than
+		 * the size of the inline extent, resize the extent, etc).
+		 * We release the path because to get the page we might need to
+		 * read the extent item from disk (data not in the page cache).
+		 */
+		btrfs_release_path(path);
+		return btrfs_truncate_page(inode, offset, page_end - offset, 0);
+	}
+
+	btrfs_set_file_extent_ram_bytes(leaf, fi, size);
+	size = btrfs_file_extent_calc_inline_size(size);
+	btrfs_truncate_item(root, path, size, 1);
+
+	if (test_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_REF_COWS, &root->state))
+		inode_sub_bytes(inode, item_end + 1 - new_size);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /*
  * this can truncate away extent items, csum items and directory items.
  * It starts at a high offset and removes keys until it can't find
@@ -4243,27 +4284,40 @@ search_again:
 			 * special encodings
 			 */
 			if (!del_item &&
-			    btrfs_file_extent_compression(leaf, fi) == 0 &&
 			    btrfs_file_extent_encryption(leaf, fi) == 0 &&
 			    btrfs_file_extent_other_encoding(leaf, fi) == 0) {
-				u32 size = new_size - found_key.offset;
-
-				if (test_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_REF_COWS, &root->state))
-					inode_sub_bytes(inode, item_end + 1 -
-							new_size);
 
 				/*
-				 * update the ram bytes to properly reflect
-				 * the new size of our item
+				 * Need to release path in order to truncate a
+				 * compressed extent. So delete any accumulated
+				 * extent items so far.
 				 */
-				btrfs_set_file_extent_ram_bytes(leaf, fi, size);
-				size =
-				    btrfs_file_extent_calc_inline_size(size);
-				btrfs_truncate_item(root, path, size, 1);
+				if (btrfs_file_extent_compression(leaf, fi) !=
+				    BTRFS_COMPRESS_NONE && pending_del_nr) {
+					err = btrfs_del_items(trans, root, path,
+							      pending_del_slot,
+							      pending_del_nr);
+					if (err) {
+						btrfs_abort_transaction(trans,
+									root,
+									err);
+						goto error;
+					}
+					pending_del_nr = 0;
+				}
+
+				err = truncate_inline_extent(inode, path,
+							     &found_key,
+							     item_end,
+							     new_size);
+				if (err) {
+					btrfs_abort_transaction(trans,
+								root, err);
+					goto error;
+				}
 			} else if (test_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_REF_COWS,
 					    &root->state)) {
-				inode_sub_bytes(inode, item_end + 1 -
-						found_key.offset);
+				inode_sub_bytes(inode, item_end + 1 - new_size);
 			}
 		}
 delete:
-- 
1.9.1

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