linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.2 32/61] bpf, array: fix heap out-of-bounds access when updating elements

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Date:	Sat, 12 Dec 2015 12:06:00 -0800
From:	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
	stable@...r.kernel.org, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
Subject: [PATCH 4.2 32/61] bpf, array: fix heap out-of-bounds access when updating elements

4.2-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>

[ Upstream commit fbca9d2d35c6ef1b323fae75cc9545005ba25097 ]

During own review but also reported by Dmitry's syzkaller [1] it has been
noticed that we trigger a heap out-of-bounds access on eBPF array maps
when updating elements. This happens with each map whose map->value_size
(specified during map creation time) is not multiple of 8 bytes.

In array_map_alloc(), elem_size is round_up(attr->value_size, 8) and
used to align array map slots for faster access. However, in function
array_map_update_elem(), we update the element as ...

memcpy(array->value + array->elem_size * index, value, array->elem_size);

... where we access 'value' out-of-bounds, since it was allocated from
map_update_elem() from syscall side as kmalloc(map->value_size, GFP_USER)
and later on copied through copy_from_user(value, uvalue, map->value_size).
Thus, up to 7 bytes, we can access out-of-bounds.

Same could happen from within an eBPF program, where in worst case we
access beyond an eBPF program's designated stack.

Since 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs") didn't hit an
official release yet, it only affects priviledged users.

In case of array_map_lookup_elem(), the verifier prevents eBPF programs
from accessing beyond map->value_size through check_map_access(). Also
from syscall side map_lookup_elem() only copies map->value_size back to
user, so nothing could leak.

  [1] http://github.com/google/syzkaller

Fixes: 28fbcfa08d8e ("bpf: add array type of eBPF maps")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/bpf/arraymap.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ static int array_map_update_elem(struct
 		/* all elements already exist */
 		return -EEXIST;

-	memcpy(array->value + array->elem_size * index, value, array->elem_size);
+	memcpy(array->value + array->elem_size * index, value, map->value_size);
 	return 0;
 }

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