linux-kernel - Re: Rethinking sigcontext's xfeatures slightly for PKRU's benefit?

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <CALCETrVWgFPTap_DNzP5vnrtyr7jjMwFHyRy=iY0amHrQ_euwg@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Fri, 18 Dec 2015 12:49:02 -0800
From:	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To:	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc:	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
	Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>
Subject: Re: Rethinking sigcontext's xfeatures slightly for PKRU's benefit?

On Fri, Dec 18, 2015 at 12:37 PM, Linus Torvalds
<torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 18, 2015 at 12:07 PM, Dave Hansen
> <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com> wrote:
>>
>> But, I think it's a small one.  Basically, RSP would have to pointing at
>> a place which was allowed by protection keys for all of the sigframe
>> setup.
>
> Note that the whole "stack is special" is not at all a new issue.
>
> It's the main reason why sigaltstack() and SS_ONSTACK exists. This is
> in no way new to PKRU, people have had to handle the issue of
> stack-related SIGSEGV faults for a long time.
>
> So any application that uses PKRU and may play games that affects the
> stack, will always have to have a separate "safe stack" that it uses
> for signal handling. But that is in no way PKRU-specific, it's been
> the case for a lot of other memory management faults.
>

The trouble is that this isn't just limited to special "safe stack"
SA_ONSTACK aware code.  It even affects normally innocuous things.

The thing that's new is that, before PKRU, the HW stack might have
been unsafe in the sense that accessing it would fault and we need a
different backup stack for some signals.  With PKRU, we might be in a
transient extra-privileged (permissive PKRU) state, and we want to
tighten permissions for *all* signal deliveries so that, in case the
current stack is erroneous, we don't corrupt it.

Admittedly, ending up with permissive PKRU in some short sequence and
corrupt RSP is likely to corrupt things no matter what the kernel
does.  But I don't think we want to deliver SIGALRM to a library while
the main program is in a specially permissive PKRU region.

IOW, I like my idea in which signal delivery always sets PKRU to the
application-requested-by-syscall values and sigreturn restores it.
Kinda like sigaltstack, but applies to all signals and affects PKRU
instead of RSP.

--Andy
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/