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Message-Id: <20151221142438.cbd34f0e663a795e649cdfbc@linux-foundation.org>
Date:	Mon, 21 Dec 2015 14:24:38 -0800
From:	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
To:	Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@...cle.com>
Cc:	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>, mhocko@...e.com,
	mgorman@...e.de, linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] mm, oom: initiallize all new zap_details fields before
 use

On Sat, 19 Dec 2015 17:03:15 -0500 Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@...cle.com> wrote:

> On 12/19/2015 02:52 PM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > On Fri, Dec 18, 2015 at 08:04:51PM -0500, Sasha Levin wrote:
> >> > Commit "mm, oom: introduce oom reaper" forgot to initialize the two new fields
> >> > of struct zap_details in unmap_mapping_range(). This caused using stack garbage
> >> > on the call to unmap_mapping_range_tree().
> >> > 
> >> > Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@...cle.com>
> >> > ---
> >> >  mm/memory.c |    1 +
> >> >  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
> >> > 
> >> > diff --git a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c
> >> > index 206c8cd..0e32993 100644
> >> > --- a/mm/memory.c
> >> > +++ b/mm/memory.c
> >> > @@ -2431,6 +2431,7 @@ void unmap_mapping_range(struct address_space *mapping,
> >> >  	details.last_index = hba + hlen - 1;
> >> >  	if (details.last_index < details.first_index)
> >> >  		details.last_index = ULONG_MAX;
> >> > +	details.check_swap_entries = details.ignore_dirty = false;
> > Should we use c99 initializer instead to make it future-proof?
> 
> I didn't do that to make these sort of failures obvious. In this case, if we would have
> used an initializer and it would default to the "wrong" values it would be much harder
> to find this bug.
> 

If we're to make that approach useful and debuggable we should poison
the structure at the outset with some well-known and crazy pattern.  Or
use kasan.

But I don't think we need any special treatment here so yes, the
conventional way of zapping everything is best, IMO.

--- a/mm/memory.c~mm-oom-introduce-oom-reaper-fix-5-fix
+++ a/mm/memory.c
@@ -2414,7 +2414,7 @@ static inline void unmap_mapping_range_t
 void unmap_mapping_range(struct address_space *mapping,
 		loff_t const holebegin, loff_t const holelen, int even_cows)
 {
-	struct zap_details details;
+	struct zap_details details = { };
 	pgoff_t hba = holebegin >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 	pgoff_t hlen = (holelen + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 

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