linux-kernel - [RFC][PATCH 3/7] slab: Add support for sanitization

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-Id: <1450755641-7856-4-git-send-email-laura@labbott.name>
Date:	Mon, 21 Dec 2015 19:40:37 -0800
From:	Laura Abbott <laura@...bott.name>
To:	Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc:	Laura Abbott <laura@...bott.name>, linux-mm@...ck.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
	kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: [RFC][PATCH 3/7] slab: Add support for sanitization


Clearing of objects on free only happens on debug paths. This is a
security risk since sensative data may exist long past it's life
span. Add unconditional clearing of objects on free.

All credit for the original work should be given to Brad Spengler and
the PaX Team.

Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <laura@...bott.name>
---
 mm/slab.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+)

diff --git a/mm/slab.c b/mm/slab.c
index 4765c97..0ca92d8 100644
--- a/mm/slab.c
+++ b/mm/slab.c
@@ -319,6 +319,8 @@ static void kmem_cache_node_init(struct kmem_cache_node *parent)
 #define STATS_INC_ALLOCMISS(x)	atomic_inc(&(x)->allocmiss)
 #define STATS_INC_FREEHIT(x)	atomic_inc(&(x)->freehit)
 #define STATS_INC_FREEMISS(x)	atomic_inc(&(x)->freemiss)
+#define STATS_INC_SANITIZED(x)	atomic_inc(&(x)->sanitized)
+#define STATS_INC_NOT_SANITIZED(x) atomic_inc(&(x)->not_sanitized)
 #else
 #define	STATS_INC_ACTIVE(x)	do { } while (0)
 #define	STATS_DEC_ACTIVE(x)	do { } while (0)
@@ -335,6 +337,8 @@ static void kmem_cache_node_init(struct kmem_cache_node *parent)
 #define STATS_INC_ALLOCMISS(x)	do { } while (0)
 #define STATS_INC_FREEHIT(x)	do { } while (0)
 #define STATS_INC_FREEMISS(x)	do { } while (0)
+#define STATS_INC_SANITIZED(x)  do { } while (0)
+#define STATS_INC_NOT_SANITIZED(x) do { } while (0)
 #endif
 
 #if DEBUG
@@ -3359,6 +3363,27 @@ free_done:
 	memmove(ac->entry, &(ac->entry[batchcount]), sizeof(void *)*ac->avail);
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_MEMORY_SANITIZE
+static void slab_sanitize(struct kmem_cache *cachep, void *objp)
+{
+	if (cachep->flags & (SLAB_POISON | SLAB_NO_SANITIZE)) {
+		STATS_INC_NOT_SANITIZED(cachep);
+	} else {
+		memset(objp, SLAB_MEMORY_SANITIZE_VALUE, cachep->object_size);
+
+		if (cachep->ctor)
+			cachep->ctor(objp);
+
+		STATS_INC_SANITIZED(cachep);
+	}
+}
+#else
+static void slab_sanitize(struct kmem_cache *cachep, void *objp)
+{
+	return;
+}
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Release an obj back to its cache. If the obj has a constructed state, it must
  * be in this state _before_ it is released.  Called with disabled ints.
@@ -3369,6 +3394,8 @@ static inline void __cache_free(struct kmem_cache *cachep, void *objp,
 	struct array_cache *ac = cpu_cache_get(cachep);
 
 	check_irq_off();
+
+	slab_sanitize(cachep, objp);
 	kmemleak_free_recursive(objp, cachep->flags);
 	objp = cache_free_debugcheck(cachep, objp, caller);
 
@@ -4014,6 +4041,14 @@ void slabinfo_show_stats(struct seq_file *m, struct kmem_cache *cachep)
 		seq_printf(m, " : cpustat %6lu %6lu %6lu %6lu",
 			   allochit, allocmiss, freehit, freemiss);
 	}
+#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_MEMORY_SANITIZE
+	{
+		unsigned long sanitized = atomic_read(&cachep->sanitized);
+		unsigned long not_sanitized = atomic_read(&cachep->not_sanitized);
+
+		seq_printf(m, " : sanitized %6lu %6lu", sanitized, not_sanitized);
+	}
+#endif
 #endif
 }
 
-- 
2.5.0

--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/