Message-Id: <8478662197240c86bb81441f6f6f711b9d7a0e33.1452015822.git.jslaby@suse.cz>
Date:	Tue,  5 Jan 2016 18:45:57 +0100
From:	Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
To:	stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
	PaX Team <pageexec@...email.hu>,
	Emese Revfy <re.emese@...il.com>,
	Brad Spengler <spender@...ecurity.net>,
	Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@...ndmicro.com.cn>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
	"David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
	Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
Subject: [PATCH 3.12 13/91] net, scm: fix PaX detected msg_controllen overflow in scm_detach_fds

From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>

3.12-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

[ Upstream commit 6900317f5eff0a7070c5936e5383f589e0de7a09 ]

David and HacKurx reported a following/similar size overflow triggered
in a grsecurity kernel, thanks to PaX's gcc size overflow plugin:

(Already fixed in later grsecurity versions by Brad and PaX Team.)

[ 1002.296137] PAX: size overflow detected in function scm_detach_fds net/core/scm.c:314
               cicus.202_127 min, count: 4, decl: msg_controllen; num: 0; context: msghdr;
[ 1002.296145] CPU: 0 PID: 3685 Comm: scm_rights_recv Not tainted 4.2.3-grsec+ #7
[ 1002.296149] Hardware name: Apple Inc. MacBookAir5,1/Mac-66F35F19FE2A0D05, [...]
[ 1002.296153]  ffffffff81c27366 0000000000000000 ffffffff81c27375 ffffc90007843aa8
[ 1002.296162]  ffffffff818129ba 0000000000000000 ffffffff81c27366 ffffc90007843ad8
[ 1002.296169]  ffffffff8121f838 fffffffffffffffc fffffffffffffffc ffffc90007843e60
[ 1002.296176] Call Trace:
[ 1002.296190]  [<ffffffff818129ba>] dump_stack+0x45/0x57
[ 1002.296200]  [<ffffffff8121f838>] report_size_overflow+0x38/0x60
[ 1002.296209]  [<ffffffff816a979e>] scm_detach_fds+0x2ce/0x300
[ 1002.296220]  [<ffffffff81791899>] unix_stream_read_generic+0x609/0x930
[ 1002.296228]  [<ffffffff81791c9f>] unix_stream_recvmsg+0x4f/0x60
[ 1002.296236]  [<ffffffff8178dc00>] ? unix_set_peek_off+0x50/0x50
[ 1002.296243]  [<ffffffff8168fac7>] sock_recvmsg+0x47/0x60
[ 1002.296248]  [<ffffffff81691522>] ___sys_recvmsg+0xe2/0x1e0
[ 1002.296257]  [<ffffffff81693496>] __sys_recvmsg+0x46/0x80
[ 1002.296263]  [<ffffffff816934fc>] SyS_recvmsg+0x2c/0x40
[ 1002.296271]  [<ffffffff8181a3ab>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x85

Further investigation showed that this can happen when an *odd* number of
fds are being passed over AF_UNIX sockets.

In these cases CMSG_LEN(i * sizeof(int)) and CMSG_SPACE(i * sizeof(int)),
where i is the number of successfully passed fds, differ by 4 bytes due
to the extra CMSG_ALIGN() padding in CMSG_SPACE() to an 8 byte boundary
on 64 bit. The padding is used to align subsequent cmsg headers in the
control buffer.

When the control buffer passed in from the receiver side *lacks* these 4
bytes (e.g. due to buggy/wrong API usage), then msg->msg_controllen will
overflow in scm_detach_fds():

  int cmlen = CMSG_LEN(i * sizeof(int));  <--- cmlen w/o tail-padding
  err = put_user(SOL_SOCKET, &cm->cmsg_level);
  if (!err)
    err = put_user(SCM_RIGHTS, &cm->cmsg_type);
  if (!err)
    err = put_user(cmlen, &cm->cmsg_len);
  if (!err) {
    cmlen = CMSG_SPACE(i * sizeof(int));  <--- cmlen w/ 4 byte extra tail-padding
    msg->msg_control += cmlen;
    msg->msg_controllen -= cmlen;         <--- iff no tail-padding space here ...
  }                                            ... wrap-around

F.e. it will wrap to a length of 18446744073709551612 bytes in case the
receiver passed in msg->msg_controllen of 20 bytes, and the sender
properly transferred 1 fd to the receiver, so that its CMSG_LEN results
in 20 bytes and CMSG_SPACE in 24 bytes.

In case of MSG_CMSG_COMPAT (scm_detach_fds_compat()), I haven't seen an
issue in my tests as alignment seems always on 4 byte boundary. Same
should be in case of native 32 bit, where we end up with 4 byte boundaries
as well.

In practice, passing msg->msg_controllen of 20 to recvmsg() while receiving
a single fd would mean that on successful return, msg->msg_controllen is
being set by the kernel to 24 bytes instead, thus more than the input
buffer advertised. It could f.e. become an issue if such application later
on zeroes or copies the control buffer based on the returned msg->msg_controllen
elsewhere.

Maximum number of fds we can send is a hard upper limit SCM_MAX_FD (253).

Going over the code, it seems like msg->msg_controllen is not being read
after scm_detach_fds() in scm_recv() anymore by the kernel, good!

Relevant recvmsg() handler are unix_dgram_recvmsg() (unix_seqpacket_recvmsg())
and unix_stream_recvmsg(). Both return back to their recvmsg() caller,
and ___sys_recvmsg() places the updated length, that is, new msg_control -
old msg_control pointer into msg->msg_controllen (hence the 24 bytes seen
in the example).

Long time ago, Wei Yongjun fixed something related in commit 1ac70e7ad24a
("[NET]: Fix function put_cmsg() which may cause usr application memory
overflow").

RFC3542, section 20.2. says:

  The fields shown as "XX" are possible padding, between the cmsghdr
  structure and the data, and between the data and the next cmsghdr
  structure, if required by the implementation. While sending an
  application may or may not include padding at the end of last
  ancillary data in msg_controllen and implementations must accept both
  as valid. On receiving a portable application must provide space for
  padding at the end of the last ancillary data as implementations may
  copy out the padding at the end of the control message buffer and
  include it in the received msg_controllen. When recvmsg() is called
  if msg_controllen is too small for all the ancillary data items
  including any trailing padding after the last item an implementation
  may set MSG_CTRUNC.

Since we didn't place MSG_CTRUNC for already quite a long time, just do
the same as in 1ac70e7ad24a to avoid an overflow.

Btw, even man-page author got this wrong :/ See db939c9b26e9 ("cmsg.3: Fix
error in SCM_RIGHTS code sample"). Some people must have copied this (?),
thus it got triggered in the wild (reported several times during boot by
David and HacKurx).

No Fixes tag this time as pre 2002 (that is, pre history tree).

Reported-by: David Sterba <dave@...os.cz>
Reported-by: HacKurx <hackurx@...il.com>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@...email.hu>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@...il.com>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@...ecurity.net>
Cc: Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@...ndmicro.com.cn>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@...essinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
---
 net/core/scm.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/core/scm.c b/net/core/scm.c
index b442e7e25e60..d30eb057fa7b 100644
--- a/net/core/scm.c
+++ b/net/core/scm.c
@@ -306,6 +306,8 @@ void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
 			err = put_user(cmlen, &cm->cmsg_len);
 		if (!err) {
 			cmlen = CMSG_SPACE(i*sizeof(int));
+			if (msg->msg_controllen < cmlen)
+				cmlen = msg->msg_controllen;
 			msg->msg_control += cmlen;
 			msg->msg_controllen -= cmlen;
 		}
-- 
2.6.4

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